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Abstract 
This thesis studies the use of data- dependent structures in cryptography. Since the 
introduction of RC5 by Rivest in 1994, which relied heavily on data- dependent rota-
tions for its securi ty [1], t hese structures have gained interest in cryptography. During 
t he Advanced Encryption Standard selection process two candidate ciphers, RC6 and 
MARS, relied on da ta- dependent structures. 
The thesis focuses on CIKS- 1, a cipher introduced in the Journal of Cryptography 
in 2002 [2], tha t relies mainly on data- dependent permutations for its security. Due 
to its reliance on these permu tations, this cipher is chosen as a basis for the study of 
data- dependent structures in cryptographic algorithms. 
The firfl t attn.ck on CIKS- 1 preflented is a choflen plaintext attack wh ich exploits 
the lack of change in the Hamming weight of the dat a as it is enciphered. The research 
shows that there is a class of weak keys wi th low weight that can be detected when the 
input weight is constrained. An attack on a 6- round reduced version of the cipher is 
outlined tha t can reduce the search space of the first round subkey to within a weight 
of two from the weight of the actual key. T his attack is experimentally shown to work 
when the subkey weights are around six or less with a total time complexity for the 
attack of 252 encryption operations. 
The second attack presented is a variant of classical differential cryptanalysis. 
Instead of focusing on the exact bit differ nee of the two inputs that make up the 
differential, th attack instead focuses on the difference in their weights. An experi-
mental attack on a thre round reduced v rsion of the cipher is presented using this 
technique which can retrieve the last round subkey of CIKS- 1 with a data complexi ty 
of approximately 235 plaintext/ciphertext pairs and time complexity of approximately 
235 encryption operations plus 268 partial decryption opera tions. I t i · also shown that 
this can theoretically be extended to the whole cipher with a total data com plexity of 
251 plaintext/ciphertext pairs and time complexity of approximately 2r,2 encryption 
operations plus 284 partial decryption op rations. 
D spite the weaknesses discovered in CIKS- 1, there is potentially some merit in 
using data- dependent permutations in ciphers. Therefore, the implementation of 
CIKS- 1 in software is investigated. T he cipher was originally designed to be fast 
in hardware and contains many operations that work at the bit level, which are 
inefficient to implement in software. i\ software version of the cipher is presented 
which uses bi ts licing, effectively parallelizing the cipher on a single processor. This 
version experimentally shows a speed up of approximately 175 times over a more 
straight- forward implementation using arrays of elements to hold individual bits. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
"Ther is a ton of evidence both in computing and ou tside of it which 
shows that poor security can be very much worse than no security at 
all . Tn pFl.r ticu l::tr, stuff which m::tkcs nsers think they me secure bnt is 
worthless is very dangerous indeed." - Alan Cox, Linux Kernel Developer 
For hundreds of years, governments throughout the world have used cryptography 
to guard their se rets from their enemies. Julius Caesar used simple substitutions 
and rotations to convey messages to his troops at war. The simplest of these ciphers 
substituted Greek letters for Roman, making it impossible for his enemies to read it . 
Another, now known as the Caesar Cipher, rotated each letter thr places down the 
alphabet (i.e. A~ D ), thus making the message appear to be gibberish if intercepted 
[5] . 
Over t ime, imple ciphers such as t hese were realized to b easily defeated using 
statistical information known about the language in use, and thus to be weak. They 
were replaced by newer ciphers using techniques such as the wholesale replacement 
of alpha- num ric characters with symbols or using published works as keys . One 
example of this was the set of encrypted messages left by Thomas Beale, an Amer-
ican prospector, outlining details on a large cache of gold, si lv r an I gems he had 
buried. One of the messages was found to have used the United States Declaration 
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of Independence a~ a key. After numbering the word~ in the document, the message 
is revealed by replacing each number in the encoded message wiLh the firs t let ter in 
the corre~pondiug word from the Declaration [5] . 
By the Second World War thc~e types of ciphers were also being replaced , man-
dated by the need for more secure communication to relay military plans. The Ger-
man government had started to employ the usc of mechanical cipher devices such as 
the German Enigma machine, which created codes increasingly difficul t to break by 
hand. This in turn led to the use of computers being employed by the code breakers, 
which again led to the development of more secure ciphers using computing. 
With the prolifera tion of computers and computer networks after the war, the us 
of cryptography moved from primarily a government and mili tary domain to other 
sectors such as banking. For example, in 2006 the Society for Worldwide Interbank 
Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT) handled an average of 11 .4 million secure 
transactions per day on their network [6]. Without encryption, these transactions 
would be vulnerable to attacks which could induce chaos in world economies. 
Today, encryption is ubiquitous in modern life. In 2005, 58% of Canadian internet 
users went online to do their banking electronically and 55% used it to pay bills, all 
secured by forms of encryption [7] . Voice- over- IF applications such as Skype™ now 
employ encryption to keep conversations private. Even operating systems such as 
Microsoft Windows™ and Apple OSX™ include functionality to encrypt personal 
files. 
One byproduct of the public exposure of cryptography is the move to ~tandardize 
it in public. For many years, ciphers used for standards were chosen by governments 
in conjunction with industry. This led to belief that these ciph rs were intentionally 
weakened to allow the government to decipher them easily. Such was suspected of 
the Data Encryption Standard (DES) [8]. Although it has never been found or even 
proven to exist, many have suspected a trap door in this cipher that was developed 
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by IBM in conjunction with the United States National Security Agency ( SA), an 
agency of the government of the Uni ted States [8]. Today, commercial security stan-
dards such as this are no longer developed secretly. Standards such as the Advanced 
Encryption Standard (AES) (the replacement for DES) are now selected through pub-
lic processes involving governments, industries and academics. In fa.ct, many of the 
world 's cryptographic ciphers are now published and undergo scrutiny from scholars 
worldwide to determine their strengths and weaknesses. One such cipher is CIKS- 1, 
which was published in January 2002 [2]. 
The CIKS- 1 cipher was proposed as a fast and secure method of encryption de-
signed for hardware implementation. The main primitives used in the algorithm are 
Data Dependent Permutations (DDPs), a large set of function · Lhat use part of the 
data involved in the encryption (either plaintext or key) to permute other portions of 
the data. These structures have appeared in other ciphers as well, including RC5 and 
RC6, but normally in the less general form, Data- Dependent Rotations (DDRs)[1][9]. 
DDRs have shown to be resistant to popular cryptanalysis techniques such as linear 
and differential attacks [10] and the CIKS- 1 authors state the same for DDPs [2]. 
1.1 Motivation for R esearch 
The DDP is proposed as a component in new cryptographic algorithms. It can be 
implemented in hardware to achieve fast speeds [2] and a subset of these permutations 
has been shown to be resistant to linear and differential cryptanaly is [10]. Two 
popular algorithms proposed by Ron Rivest , RC5 and RC6, use a subset of the DDP 
functions, in the way of DDRs, as main parts of cipher [1][9] . 
In 2002 , CIKS- 1 was proposed as a new cipher that was fas t in hardware and 
resistant to a ttack. The cipher uses a more general form of the DDP as its main 
primitive with only four other functions to create its security. Since this algorithm 
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relies so heavily on DDPs, it makes a good andidate for a study on the securi ty 
properties of the functions. Therefore, we use this cipher as our ba.sis for cryptographic 
attacks to determine the qualities of DDPs. 
1.2 Scope of Work 
The purpose of thi · thesis is to investigate the properties of DDPs as a cryptographic 
primitive. First , an introduction to cryptography and concepts required in later 
chapters is provided. Included is a look at general guidelines for secure a lgorithms 
and common ryptanalysis techniques. T here is also an overview of selected ciphers 
with DDPs with a more in- depth look at CIKS- 1. 
In !at r chapters the CIKS- 1 cipher is used as a testbed for th DDP. The 
properti s of th DDP are studied under the use of low weight inputs, exposing the 
need for a well- defined key schedule. A differential attack i proposed for the cipher 
which exposes limitations on the CIKS- 1 use of DDPs. Finally, there is a study of 
techniques optimizing speed when implementing DDPs in software. 
1.3 Thesis Outline 
The thesis progre ·ses in the following manner: 
• Chapter One: An introduction to the research conducted. 
• Chapter Two: An introduction to cryptography and cryptanalysis. 
• Chapter Three: An introduction to ciphers with data- dependent structures, 
with particular focus given to the CIKS- 1 cipher. 
• Chapter Four: A weight- based attack on the CIKS- 1 cipher is proposed. 
• Chapter Five: A differential attack on the CIKS- 1 ciph r i · proposed. 
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• Chapter Six: A bitsliced implementation of CIKS-1 is presen ted as an efficient 
software implementation. 
• Chapter Seven: A summary of results and conclusions. 
1.4 Summary of Results 
In Chapter 4 of this thesis, a weight- based attack on the CIKS- 1 cipher is proposed. 
The attack focuses on the limited effect of the weight of the key on the weight of 
the data being processed by the cipher. A class of weak keys with low Hamming 
weight that can be exploited to constrict the search area for actual key is presented. 
An attack is demonstrated on a six- round reduced version of the cipher wi th subkey 
Hamming weights limited to six or less. The attack has a total time complexity of 
252 encryption operations and reduces the search space for the actual key to a value 
with Hamming weights within two of the actual weight. 
In Chapter 5 another attack is proposed which takes advantage of weight prop-
agation in CIKS- 1. This attack is a non- tradi tional differential attack where the 
diftcrcutials arc diHcrcuce::; in the Hamming weight of the plaintext inputs. Au ex-
perimental verification of t he attack is complet ed on a three- round rednced version 
of the cipher with a data complexity of 235 plaintext /ciphertext pairs and a time 
complexity of 268 p artial decryption operations. Differentials for the attack on the 
full 8- round versions of the cipher are also presented which results in an attack with a 
data complexity of 252 plaintext/ciphert ext pairs and a t ime complexity of 284 partial 
decryption operations. 
Finally, in Chapter 6, efficient implementation for CIKS- 1 in software is investi-
gated. Since the cipher was designed for hardware, many of the primitives perform 
opera tions at the level of bits and a.s such do not effectively utilize word- ba.'ied in-
structions in genera l purpose processors. An implementation of CIKS- 1 using the 
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bitslicing technique is presented which fully utilizes the instru tion s t of modern 
processors. The 32- bit and 64- bit versions of this implementation a re compared to 
implementations using arrays and bitset (from the C++ STL). It is shown that the 
bitslice techniqu provides a speed up of 234 times for the 32 bit implementation 
and 425 times for the a 64- bit implementation over th fast st of the other versions 
presented . 
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Chapter 2 
Overview of Cryptography 
Cryptography is the study and process of hiding information. Generally, it is used to 
keep third parties from viewing sensitive data. T his includes concealing stored data 
such as encrypting data on a computer hard drive, but more often refers to the transfer 
of information over an insecure communications channel. For illustration , a transfer of 
information model will be used in this discussion, employing the following characters: 
Alice, the data transmitter; Bob, the data receiver; and Oscar, th intruder. 
To transfer the data securely, a cryptosystem is used. A cryptosystem is defined 
as a set of functions and data sets required to transmit data from one party to 
another, secure from interception by a third party. As presented in [11], the parts of 
a cryptosystem include: 
• an encryption function, 
• a decryption function, 
• a set of possible plaintexts, 
• a set of possible ciphertexts, and 
• a set of possible keys or keyspace. 
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The encryption function is used to t ransform da ta in the set of possible plaintexts 
to data in the set of possible ciphertexts, based on a key from the keyspace. This 
function must be one- to- one in order for the plaintext to be restored by the decryption 
function [12]. Figure 2.1 shows the standard model of a general cryptosystem. 
I n..;cl·urc Ch:mncl 
Figure 2.1: A Model of a Crytopsystem 
If Alice has plaintext da ta p0 , p 1 , --- , Pn- l and wants to send it to Bob, but wants 
to make sure that only he can read it , she needs to encrypt the da ta. To do this she 
can use the encryption function fe to produce ciphertext ci = fe(Pi ), with a key e. 
She can then send the resulting ci ph rtext data c0 , c1 , . .. , Cn- J to Bob over an insecure 
channeL When Bob receives the data he uses the decryption function, 9d to compute 
Pi = gd(ci ) with key d to reproduce the plaintext. 
In an effective cryptosystem, the decryption key d (and sometimes the encryption 
key e) is the only piece of information that needs to be kept from Oscar in order to 
ensure confidentiality of the transmit ted data. Therefore, Alice must have a secure 
mechanism to provide Bob with the key. Oscar is therefore left with trying to guess 
the key to decrypt the data, or trying to exploit flaws in the cryptosystcrn to recover 
the original data. This latter approach is known as cryptanalysis. 
In the following sections, an introduction to cryptography is presented. There 
is a discussion of the different types of cryptographic functions (or ciphers) and the 
ways in which they are used. This is followed by a discussion of general properties 
for secure ciphers. Finally there is an introduction to cryptanalysis, th practice of 
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attacking iphers. 
2 .1 Types of Cryptographic Algorithms 
Cryptographic algorithms are normally classified into two groups Lmsccl on the type 
of k y which they use. When the encryption key mploycd in the cipher must be kept 
secret, it is referred to as a symmetric (sometimes called shared or secret) key cipher. 
When the security of the cipher docs not depend on the encryption key used being 
kept ·ecr t , the cipher is referred to as an asymmetric (or public) key cipher. These 
ciphers get their names from the fact that they are designed in such a way that one 
key can be distributed publicly, without compromising the s curi ty of the function. 
Symmetric and public key ciphers are dis usscd in the following se tions. However, 
symmetric key algorithms are explored more since such algorithms arc the focus of 
this thesis. 
2.1.1 Public Key Ciphers 
In [13] Diffie and Hellman outlined a new method for cnrrypt.ing data which uses two 
separate k ys rath r than the traditional one key. Of the two, one is to be kept private 
while the oth r is made public. Th y called the scheme public k y cryptography. 
In a public key cryptosystem as proposed by Diffie and Helman th ender en-
crypts the data using the public key which is unique for each r ceiver. The encryption 
is nominally done using a. mathematical computation which is easy for the sender to 
perform. Security is gained by choosing a problem which is intractable with the pub-
licly known information. The receiv r (of course) has extra. information, the priva te 
key. This key is used in a function, ommonly referred to as a trapdoor function, that 
allows the r ceiver to easily recover th original data. 
The most frequenty used public key algorithm, referred to as RSA, wa proposed 
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by Rive::; t , Shamir and Adleman in [14] and is presented here a.'::i an example. The 
!:lecurity of the RSA algorithm is based on the assumption that factoring the product 
of two large primes is an intractable problem. To generate key::; , the receiver must 
choose two large prime numbers p and q. From these numbers, 
n=pxq (2.1) 
and 
¢(n) = (p- 1)(q- 1) (2.2) 
are generated. Then another number b is chosen such that 1 < b < ¢( n) and the 
greatest common divisor of b and ¢( n) is 1. The final part of the key a is calculated 
such that 
a= b- 1 mod ¢(n). (2.3) 
The public key consists of n and b, while the private key consists of p , q and a. 
To encrypt data the sender must convert it to an integer form between 0 and n - 1. 
If the message is large, it will need to be broken into multiple integers. Once in this 
form , the data x is encrypted using the function 
(2 .4) 
Once received, the ciphertext can be decrypted using the inverse trapdoor function 
9(n,a) (y) = ya mod n. (2.5) 
The security of RSA is based on the widely held belief that given a choice of large 
enough primes, knowing f (n,b)(x), band n solving for x presents a computationally 
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infeasible problem of factoring large numbers that are a product of two primes. Know-
ing either a or the primes p and q so that a can be computed, allows the receiver to 
reverse the encryption using the trapdoor function g(n,a)(y). This leaves an attacker 
with the most obvious attack possibility of factoring n into its two prime factors p 
and q so that a can be computed. However, prime factorization is considered to be 
computationally difficult problem for large n (e.g. n of a few hundred bits). 
Other popular public key ciphers include those based on the Discrete Logarithm 
Problem. The algorithms are based on logarithms in finite groups which are one-
way functions such as the ordinary logarithm found in RSA. One such cipher is the 
ElGamal cryptosystem [11] . 
2.1.2 Symmetric Key Ciphers 
Due to the mathematics involved in public key cryptosystems, the ciphers are inher-
ently slow in encryption speed. In applications where speed is a priority, symmetric 
key ciphers are normally employed. In some applications the two are combined , using 
public key cryptography to transmit a secret key that can then be used by symmetric 
key ciphers. 
Symmetric key ciphers, also called shared or secret key, come in two varieties -
stream ciphers and block ciphers. The following sections outline the two types, giving 
more weight to block ciphers since they are studied closely in the chapters that follow. 
Stream Ciphers 
Stream ciphers are designed to encipher data with minimal delay. To do this , they 
operate on single symbols at a time, thus eliminating the requirement to wai t for 
data to build in a queue. The primary component of a stream cipher is a keystream 
generator, the purpose of which is to generate a continuous stream of pseudorandom 
bits. This stream of bits is know as the keystream and is combined with the plaintext 
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to produce the ciphertext. The combining operator can vary from cipher to cipher; 
however it is most commonly a simple modulo- two addition or bitwise exclusive- or. 
The decryption of the data is achieved by running the ciphertext through the 
same cipher to obtain the plaintext. In order for this to work, th s nder and receiver 
must not only have access to the same key, they must also ensure that the keystream 
generation i. synchronized on both ends of th communication. Figure 2.2 shows the 
basic stream ipher model. 
Key 
Encryption Key Decryption 
Figure 2.2: Stream Cipher Model 
Stream ciphers are commonly employed in communication networks. The proto-
cols used in these networks commonly require limited amounts of buffering to reduce 
the amount of latency. Example stream ciphers found in common n tworks are the E0 
cipher, used to secure communications between Bluetooth devices, and the Wireless 
Equivalent Protocol, or WEP, found in IEEE 802.llb wireless networks [15][16]. 
Block Ciphers 
Block ciphers are symmetric (or shared) k y cryptographic algorithms that encipher a 
fixed length of data, or block, at a time. They are typically product ciphers, meaning 
they have a simple function known as a round, and the final ciphertext i a result of 
passing the data through many rounds. Each round uses a different key known as 
a subkey; therefore, there is a requirement to be able to derive these keys from the 
shared key. The process used to d rive the subkeys is known as a key schedule. 
Block ciphers are designed to take advantage of the word length of the hardware on 
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which they will be used. If designing a block cipher for a modem personal computer, 
it would most likely be designed with 32 bit or 64- bit words to take full advantage 
of the instruction set provided by the processor. 
The Substitution Permutation Network (SPN) is commonly used as an example 
of a block cipher. Presented by Feistel in [17], the SP is a simple cipher consisting 
only of substitu tions and permutations , as its name suggests. The components of an 
SPN are quite similar to that of DES and AES , but th algorithm is simpler, making 
it a good learning tool. The simple exampl presented in Figure 2.3 is used by Beys 
in [18], in a tutorial to _illustrate cryptanalysis techniques. 
As cau be secu in Figure 2.3, the algori thm takes as input a. fi.xed data. block of 
JG bits. T he firs t three rounds use an identical round strncture: add the subkey (in 
this case by simple modulo- two addit ion) ; perform a substitution for each sub- block 
of four bits comprising the da ta; and p rmute the result. The fourth round does not 
include the permuta tion, but an additional subkey is added following the substitution. 
This is done to prevent an attacker from ignoring the final substitution since wi thou t 
the added key it could easily be revers d. 
The Advanced Encryption Standard 
From 1997 to 2001 , The United States National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) held a competition to replace the DES. The winner was to be chosen based on 
security, cost and characteristics of the cipher [19]. Security was the most important 
criterion, and as such, any cipher that showed vulnerability during the competit ion 
was eliminated . The other two criteria were then used to differentiate the remaining 
candida tes. The cost criterion looked at the complexity of each algorithm with respect 
to both sp eed and memory. Finally th characteristics of each cipher were compared , 
including such qualities as flexibility and simplicity of the cipher. 
In the end , the Rijndael cipher by Daemen and Rijmen was chosen as the new 
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AES. The ciph r is an iterated ciph r with varying key length depeuding on the 
number of rounds employed. Table 2. 1 shows the key size for the thr e round lengths 
dch11cd for the cipher. All operations nscd in tltc cipher arc word oricnt<'d. 
umber of Rounds 
10 
12 
14 
Key Size 
128 bits 
192 bits 
256 bits 
Table 2.1: Number of Rounds Versus Key Size for AES 
AES has a structure quite similar to the SPN presented in the previous section. 
There is au initial whitening of the data by mixing the IirsL round subkey with Lhc 
plaintext via an exclusive-or operation. T hen the next T - 1 rounds involve a sub-
stitution , linear transformation and subkey mixing just as with the SP . The final 
round excludes th column mixing portion of the linear transformation. 
The sub titution used in AES is an 8- by- 8 substitution box, or S Box. For each 
byte in the cipher data, the substitution replaces the data ba ·ed on a conceptual 
256- by- bit lookup table. These values an also be calculated using finite field 
mathematics. 
The lin ar transformation that is performed next i a combination of a simple 
shifting of bytes and column mixing. T he data in the AES is held in a variable called 
State which is a 4- by- 4 byte matrix d fined as 
so,o so,! so,2 so,3 
State= s1,o s1 ,1 8 1,2 s l ,3 (2.6) 
82,0 82,1 82,2 82,3 
83,0 83,1 83,2 83,3 
where Sm,n is the state byte s in row m , column n . The shifting rotat s each row m 
bytes to the left with wrapping. To mix the columns of data in the state variable 
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each column of data is multiplied by a column of data in a finite field!F28 . T he result 
of the multiplication is used to replace the original data of the olumn. Finally, for 
each round there is subkey mixing which is done via an exclusive or as was the case 
with the whitening [11]. 
Modes of Operation 
In [20], the U.S. ational Bureau of Standards (now NIST) introduced four modes 
of operation for block ciphers: Electonic Codebook (ECB), Cipher Block Chaining 
(CBC) , Cipher Feedback (CFB) and Output Feedback (OFB), under which DES 
could be run. T hese modes specify how the cipher could be used in various scenarios, 
and though intended originally for use with DES, they are commonly used with many 
current block ciphers. 
ECI3 is the native mode for all block ciphers. It is defined as the most simple 
use of the ciph r , ncrypting one block at a t ime, independent of all other blocks. 
Due to this independence, the sender is gum·ante d that an error in transmission in 
a single block will not propagate to others. ECB mode works straightforwardly for 
fixed length data that is a multiple of the block size. If the data does not completely 
fill mul tiple blocks, padding is required in the final block. When u ing this mode, the 
sender should be aware that repeating blocks of data using the same key will result 
in a repeat in ciphertext at the output, which could be exploited for an attack . 
The llext mode defined in [20] iR CBC mode. Iu this mode, each ou t.pn t. block is 
dependent on the last with an Init ialization Vector (IV) being used to produce the 
first round output block. To use this mode, the send r firs t selects an IV, c0 . The 
da ta is t hen encrypted using 
(2.7) 
where i 2: 1 and f k is the encrypt ion algorithm in use with key k. As can be seen, each 
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plaintext block Pi is added modulo-two with the previous ciphertext block ci- J before 
being encrypted (with the exception of the first block, which is added modulo- two 
with the IV) . The inverse of this opera tion is 
(2.8) 
where .9k is the decryption algorithm, using the same key k . 
The advantage this mode has over ECB is that identical inputs do not result in 
identical output when using the same key. However, this mode still requires padding 
when the dat a size is not a multiple of the block size. As well , the introduction of 
dependence on previous ciphertexts comes with error propagation. An error in ci will 
result in errors in both Pi+l and Pi· Also, the loss of a single block of ciphertext (ci ) 
in transmission results in a loss of two plaintext blocks in decryption. 
To overcome the limitation of requiring t he plaintext size to be a multiple of 
the cipher block size, a mode that converts a block cipher into a stream cipher can 
be used. Both CFB and OFB accomplish this task. When using these modes the 
encryption and decryption operations need to be synchronized to ensure the plaintext 
at both ends of the cryptosystem match. 
In CFB mode, m bits are encrypted at a time where m ::; n, the number of bits 
in a block. Again, the CFB uses an IV, x 0 . Once chosen, the plaintext blocks are 
encrypted using the operation 
(2.9) 
where MSBm is the m most significant bits of the encryption of the input variable; 
fk( xi ) and Pi and Ci represent m bits of plaintext and ciphertext respectively. This 
mode also requires the calculation of the next block cipher input, Xi+l using 
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(2.10) 
where LSBn- m is the (n - m) least significant bits of :r;i and "I I" is a concatenation 
operation. Decryption is a similar operation to encryption. 
CFB can be used to reduce the padding requirement , however it comes with a 
cost in error propagation. Depending on the location of the error in the ciphertext, 
a single bit error in transmission can create errors in as many as ( !f!: + 1) plaintext 
blocks. After the error has propagated through, CFB will start producing the correct 
p laintext again at the receiver, or self- synchronize. The result of losing a block in 
CFB is equivalent to that in CBC. 
The last mode outlined in [20] is OFB mode. This mode is similar to CFB mode in 
that it transforms a block cipher to a stream cipher; however, instead of feeding back 
ciphertext, keystream bits are fed back. Again, an IV :r:0 is chosen and the ciphertext 
of m bits, 1 ~ m ~ n, is created using 
(2.11) 
the same operation as in CFB. However the next value of input is calculated as 
(2.12) 
thus depending only on the previous values of the keystream. This has the advantage 
that an error in transmission of the ciphertext will not propagate to the decryption 
of other plaintext bits. However, a lost block of ciphertext results in loss of synchro-
nization and continual error in the recovered plaintext. 
Even though CFB and OFB can be used to convert a block cipher into a stream 
cipher, it should be noted that this does not automatically overcome the latency 
problems with block ciphers. This is due to the fact that the block cipher usually 
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functions on larger data inputs. 
Now that the various types of ciphers and their operation have been introduced , 
the next section looks at properties considered desirable for secure ciphers. After this, 
an introduction to cryptanalysis is presented. 
2.2 Properties of Secure Block Ciphe rs 
In the body of literature for cryptography research there are many theories presented 
for what makes a secure block cipher. For modern cryptography, one of the first 
works to approach the topic was [12] by Shannon. In this paper, Shannon approaches 
the study of cryptosystems from an information theory point of view. In doing so, 
he presents properties that are desirable to make a cipher secure. Since then, others 
have added to this list , and a subset of these properties is presented here. 
It should be noted that though these properties can be used as a guide in design , 
in [21] Knudsen warns against overvaluing them. He notes tha t Shannon's principle 
to ensure that a cipher is secure against all known attacks is still considered the best 
design principle for ciphers. 
2.2.1 Confus ion and Diffusion 
Confusion and diffusion are rela ted properties presented by Shannon in [12] . Confu-
sion is a relationship between t he key and the ciphertext . The goal is to make the 
relationship as complex as possible. If the relationship is simple (for example a simple 
rotation of symbols such as a Caesar Cipher) , the attacker can use simple statistical 
analysis, based on knowledge of the plaintext language, to break the cipher. However, 
as more complexity (or confusion) is added to the relationship, the statistical analysis 
required by the attacker grows in complexity as well, with the ultimate goal of being 
infeasible. 
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Diffusion is the concept of hiding any redundancy of in put. bits from beiug discov-
ered in the output bits. The goal is to have each bit. of plaintext infiuence as much 
of the ciphertext a.s possible. T his makes it more difficnlt for t he attacker to detect 
any statistical relationship between the plaintext and ciphertext. 
2.2.2 Spurious Keys and Unicity Distance 
Spurious keys are keys used in decrypting ciphertext that lead to a plaintext that 
has meaning, but is not actually the plaintext. If an attacker has only the ciphertext 
and through trying multiple keys comes across two keys in which the plaintext result 
is meaningful, without further information it would be impossible to determine the 
intended message. 
Using this concept, Shannon presents the idea of unicity distance in [12] . This is 
defined as the amount of ciphertext that would be required to reduce the number of 
spurious keys to zero. Put another way, unicity distance is the amount of ciphertext 
the attacker would require to ensure the correct key has been found, given enough 
time to exhaustively search all keys. Obviously, the larger the unicity distance, the 
better for the security of the cipher, as it has a direct relationship on the complexity 
of a ciphertext- only attack. 
2 .2.3 Completeness, Avalanche Effect and the Strict 
Avalanche Criteria 
Completeness, avalanche effect and the Strict Avalanche Criteria (SAC) are related 
measures of how well a cipher is designed. In fact, they are an expansion on Shannon's 
concept of diffusion. In [22], a cipher is said to be complete if each output bit is 
dependent on all of the plaintext bits in the output. Feistel introduces a related 
concept, the avalanche effect, [17] whereby a change in any one input bit should 
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result in a change of~ of the output bits. 
In [23], Webster and Tavares combine Lhe previous ideas to define Lhe concept of 
SAC. 13y definition of SAC, a change in one iuput bit :-;ltonld change each output 
bit with a probability of ~ · Ciphers exhibiting this property do not have a strong 
correlation between input and output bi ts. 
2.3 Introduction to Cryptanalysis 
In the past , many ciphers depended on the attacker not knowing how they worked 
to ensure th ir security. In modern cryptography this is no longer the normal proce-
dure. Modern cryptographers design their iphers according to Ker khoff 's Principle: 
assume that your attacker is familiar with the algorithm in use. T hi · means that the 
attacker cannot just work on decrypting intercepted data, but also work 011 finding 
fl aws in the cipher itself. 
T h re are four common types of cryptanalytic attacks: known ciphertext, known 
plaintext, chosen plaintext and chosen ciphertext. A known ciphertext attack is the 
same as the attacker intercepting ciphertext during transmission. o other informa-
tion is known. In a known plaintext attack, the attacker ha: th benefit of not only 
having the ciphertext , but also the corresponding plaintext. For the chosen plaintext 
attack, not only is the plaintext known, but the attacker is assumed to have been able 
to access the encryption device and thus is able to choose a particular plaintext of 
interest and to det rmine the corresponding ciphertext. The chosen cipher text attack 
is similar to the chosen plaintext ; however, access to the decryption device has been 
gained and therefore the attacker can choose a ciphertext of interest and obtain the 
plaintext [11]. 
In all cases, the objective of the attack is to gain information about plaintext 
encrypted giv n only ciphertext. The ultimate goal is to obtain the key, but any 
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information revealed will allow the attacker to reduce the number of keys needed to 
search. In fact , for an ideal cipher, an exhaustive key search (trying all possible keys) 
is the only method of attack. In practice, many ciphers leak information about their 
key, reducing the size of the search space. An attack on a. cipher is considered to 
be successful when is able to reduce the search space to less than the 2n possible 
keys (where n is the key size in bits). Although many attacks are theoretical in 
nature and not possible to implement due to the time or amount of data. required , 
any weakness found is usually considered an indication that there may be others to 
find , and therefore the cipher will be considered inadequate. 
The following sections outline some examples of attacks found in the literature. 
2.3.1 Meet- in- the- Middle Attack 
In [24], Merkle and Hellman introduce the concept of a meet- in-th middle attack. 
When investigating ways to improve ciphers by running data. through a. cipher multiple 
times, they noted a. flaw in blindly choosing two keys and running the data. through 
two iterations of the cipher. Even though the key length is effectively larger, they 
found that with a. trade off on the amount of memory required, the attacker can 
attack the cipher in only double the time. 
To do this , the attacker must have access to a. set of plaintexts and corresponding 
ciphertexts. The attacker first encrypts a. portion of the plaintext for all possible 
keys through the first half of the combined cipher and stores the result. The attacker 
then takes the corresponding portion of the original ciphertexts and docs a partial 
decryption of the data. for all known keys. If a match is found between the encrypted 
and decrypted data (in the middle of the cipher) , a. second test with more data. can 
be performed to show the correct combined key has been found. 
This attack exploits the fact that in doubling the key size, it is expected that the 
number of exhaustive key search operations will go from 2n to 22n. However , if there 
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is enough available memory (2n blocks), this attack can be performed in 2 x 2n or 
2n+ 1 operations. When designing a cipher , care should be employed to ensure this 
flaw is not. made available to ;.m attacker. 
2.3.2 Linear Cryptanalysis 
In [25], Matsui presented an attack on the DES cipher which exploited a bias derived 
from the probability of linear equations of data in the cipher. This attack is known 
as linear cryptanalysis and is outlined in a more general form in [18]. 
The idea behind the attack is to find linear equations involving both input and 
output bits which have a high or low probability of being satisfied. These equations 
are commonly of the form 
(2 .13) 
where the i and k subscripts are indicators of the position of the bit in the input (.x) 
and output (y) , respectively. If a cipher is completely random, an equation of this 
form should hold with a probability of ~ · If an equation of this form can be found 
with a large bias in the probability, it can be used to extract subkey bits within the 
cipher. 
The first step in setting up a linear cryptanalysis attack is to examine the non-
linear elements of the cipher for possible linear approximations. This can be achieved 
by running all possible inputs through the cipher component (e.g. s- box) , masking 
off all combinations of input and output bits, and counting the number of times the 
exclusive-or of the masked input bits is equal to the exclusive- or of the masked output 
bits. Once this procedure is complete, the combinations with the largest and smallest 
counts are those with the largest bias and can therefore be used for the attack. 
When the analysis of all non- linear components is complete, the a ttacker must 
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then string together the inputs of interest to provide a complete paLh through to 
the second last round of the cipher. For instance, if you have approximation for one 
component of 
(2. 14) 
the next compon nt in the chain should use the output bit y3 as its input. In using 
this method, the total bias of the approximation can be calculated using Matsui's 
Piling- Up Lemma 
n 
E = 2n-l II C 1,2,3, ... ,n t· (2. 15) 
i = l 
where n represents the number of active components and Ei is bias of probabilit ies, 
or the amount by which they deviate from ~. 
This equation is derived with th assumption that all components arc indepen-
dent which they are strictly not. However, in most cases it provides a close enough 
approximation. 
Once an approximation through to the second last round has been found , the 
attack can commence. The output bits from the approximation indicate which bits 
of the final subkey one can attack, based on their relationship to t.hc final subkey 
in the last round . The attack is a known plaintext attack where the attacker uses 
input bits involved in the linear approximation. The output is run back through the 
final round using all possible values for the partial subkey under attack in the final 
round. With each decryption, a count is kept of how many times the expected value 
of the approximation at the output of the second last round is consistent with the 
input bits. Once all possible subkeys have b en tried , the partial subkey with the 
largest bias is chosen as the actual value of the bits in the subkey. In [25], the data 
complexity of the attack is given to be approximately 1 
t 1,2,3,. ,1'l 
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2. 3 .3 Differential Cryptan alysis 
Introduced by Biham and Shamir in [26], differential cryptanalysis is a chosen plain-
text attack. It is based on the fact that in an ideal cryptographic algori thm, given 
any difference in the input , !::,X , th probability of resulting in a particular differ nee 
at the output, !::,Y , would be p6 x _.6 y = 2:. where n is th number of bits in X. If we 
can find a difference in the input that deviates from this probability, we can exploit 
it to xtract information about the cipher key. 
Differcutial cryptana.lysis classically ut>es Hett> of pain; of iuputs that have a cmn-
mon difference !::,X = X 0 EB X 1, where X 0 and X 1 repre ent two different input values 
and EB represents bit- wise exclusive- or. These pairs, when used as input to the ci-
pher, result in an output difference Y0 EB Yt which with high probability is equal to a 
value !::,Y. The pair, (!::,X, !::,Y) is referred to as a differential. 
To find differentials of interest, the various primitives of the cipher are usually 
analyzed to find any pattern tha t may be exploitable. For example, if a cipher 
uses substitutiou boxes , or s- boxes, eacb iudividual s- box can be analyz.ed to fiud 
a difl:"erential that occurs with a probabil ity greater than expected. The larger the 
deviation, generally the greater the likelihood of success for the attack on the cipher. 
Once the individual components are analyzed , the differential must be combined 
to find a total differential that. passes through the entire cipher with the great st 
probability. 
Highly likely differentials can be exploited to determine key bit information. Once 
a highly probable differential (!::,X, !::,Y) is found for r rounds of an r+1 round cipher, 
the lat:it rouud subkey can be attacked. Many pairs with the input difference !::,X are 
encrypted over r + 1 rounds. Each pair is then decrypted for the last round using all 
possible subkeys. A check for the output difference ~::,y of round r - 1 is perform d 
and a count for the number of time it occurred with the given subkey is increment d. 
The actual subkey will result in the largest count of the 6.Y occurrences as predicted 
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by the different ial. 
2 .3.4 Side-Channel Attacks 
Side-channel attacks are attacks that are not focused on the cipher itself bu t ra ther 
its implementation. When implementing an algori thm, care must be taken such that 
details of the data within are not revealed due to implementation measur ments. Two 
type. of common side- channel attacks are outlined in the following sections: timing 
attacks and power a ttacks. 
Tim ing Attacks 
Introduced by Kocher m [27], t iming attacks exploit implementations of a cipher 
which take an amount of t ime, dependent on the input data. The author lists pos-
sible reasons for the variability as: performance optimizations to bypass unnecessary 
operations, branching and conditional statements, RAM cache hi ts , and processor 
instructions such as multiplication and division that run in non- fixed Lime. 
A simple example of an implementation vulnerable to this type of attack would 
be one such that certain operations are skipped based on a condition of the data. In 
his paper, Kocher gives an example of a modular exponent algorithm that could be 
used with RSA, which includes the following pseudocode: 
i f ( bi t k of x) i s 1 th e n 
Let R k = ( S k · y ) mod n 
e l se 
It is obvious from this code that t he if case will take more t ime t han the else case. 
The author goes on to show how by measuring this time difference an atta ker an 
extract the bits from the expon nt x, the k y to decrypting the ciphertext. It should 
also be noted tha t though this attack was originally implemented on a public key 
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cipher, it can abo be used on symmetric key ciphers, an example of which is given in 
the next chapter. 
Power Attacks 
In [28], Kocher et al. investigate implementation attacks based on mea 'urement of 
power consumption. They put a 50- ohm resistor in series with pow r or ground fo r 
the circuit, and measured the voltage across the resistor, sampling it at a high rate of 
speed. Since processing circuits are made up of many transistors which change state, 
dynamic power consumption is proportional to transistor stat~ changes and hence 
processing of the different data results in unique power trac s measured as current 
entering the circuit. 
An example of an implementation that can be attacked is the DES key schedule, 
which involves the rotation of 28- bit key registers. One implementation method would 
be to use a conditional branch to check the hit being rotated off, to determine if the 
bit rotated onto the other side need to be set. Using this method, rotating a bit that 
is set would have a different signature than a bit that is not. These signatures could 
be measured in order to determine the number of set and unset bits in the registers. 
2.4 Summary 
This chapter has given an introduction to cryptography including types of algorithms 
and desired properties. An outline of common cryptanalysis techniques was also pre-
sented. The following chapter looks more closely at a single cryptographic primitive, 
the DDP. Example ciphers using DDPs are presented, including an in- depth look at 
CIKS- 1. This cipher is also analyzed using some of the techniques presented in this 
chapter. 
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Chapter 3 
Data-Dependent Permutations and 
CIKS- 1 
Data- Dependent Permutations were introduced in [29], an IBM patent filed in 1977, in 
the form of Data- Dependent Rotations. In the author's patent "System for Machine 
Enciphering," data within the cipher is subject to one of a set of operations depending 
on other data. This did not make the primitive strictly a DDP as other operations 
could be u eel ; however, it was the first example of permutations being selected via 
the data itself. 
It was not until Ron Rivest published [1] that a DDP primitive began to gain 
attention . In his paper , Rivest proposed RC5, a simple cipher based mainly on a DDR 
(a subset of the DDP functions) that was considered both fast and secure. Further 
~tudy of the DDR in [10] showed it to be resistant to both linear and differential 
cryptanalysis. 
In this chapter we look at the DDP, a class of nonlinear cryptographic primitives 
that are gaining popularity in cryptography. The properties of the DDP are reviewed, 
as well as various implementations. We then look at example ciphers using DDPs. 
In the latter part of the chapter we focus on the CIKS- 1. Since this cipher is 
built with a major dependency on DDPs for nonlinearity, it is of particular interest. 
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We look at the various compon nts used and their role in the cipher. We investigate 
the daLa fiow through the cipher and xamine how the cipher performs for accepted 
cryptographic properties. Finally, we take a look at known attacks on the CIKS- 1 
cipher. 
3.1 Data- Dependent Permutations 
A permutation, II, of width n is a one- to- one total function from a finite set, 
{0, 1, ... , n - 1} to itself. A Controlled Permutation (CP) is an indexed set of p 
permutations, {Ilo, I11 , . . . , IIp- d in which the input data is permuted by a member of 
the set chosen by the Control Vector (CV) to produce the output. Given an input x 
and a control vector i, where 0 ~ i < p, then the output is y such that y = IIi(x). The 
maximum size of the set is n! different permutations. However , due to the munber of 
control hits required and the difficulty of stmctming the selection of the permutation, 
this is impractical. In practice, CPs ar normally used with smaller CVs when used 
as cryptographic primitives. When a CP is controlled by a subset of the data in the 
function, we consider it a DDP. 
In [2] Pn;m is defined as a controlled permutation of n input bits such that there 
are 2m permutations, defined by a CV of . ize m. Pn;m is of order h, if for each 
sequence of h ~ n input bits, xo, x1, ... , xh- l, and h ~ n outputs, Yo , Y1 , ... , Yh- 1, there 
exists at least one CP which moves Xi to Yi for all i = 1, 2, ... , h. CV is of maximal 
order if h = n and it therefore contains the set of all n ! possible permutations. Also, 
Pn;m is considered strict if and only if II1 =f Il k, where i, k E { 0, ... , 2m - 1} and j =f k . 
Finally, p - l n/m is defined to be the inverse of Pn;m if and only if each Ilk from Pn;m 
is the inverse of Ili; 1 from P;:jm, for each k. 
In order to be used for cryptographic application, DDPs should be designed with 
no bias. Therefore, over all permuta tions in the set Pn;m , if the control vector k is 
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chosen uniformly, then Pr-(ITk('i) = .7) = ~ for all i and j. DDPs exhibiting this 
property are com;idered to be uniform. ln practice, it is difficult Lo build uniform 
DDPs of a useful size, so they are instead designed to be approximately uniform and 
combined with other elements to compensate [2]. 
A DDP can be designed in many ways depending on the requirement of the cipher. 
In some ciph rs (such as RC5 and RC6), the DDPs are implemented as a rotation of 
the bits. Other possibilities include bit swapping, block swapping or combinations of 
each of these techniques. 
3 .2 Ciphers with Data- Dependent Permutations 
There are many ciphers that use DDPs, but there are two in particular that have 
received more a ttention in the literature: RC5 and RC6. Although neither of these 
ciphers use DDPs in their more general form (both of these ciphers use DDRs) , the 
permutations are a major component of their algorithm. We take a cursory look 
at t hese ciphers here before we move on to ciphers using the more general DDP: 
Spectr- H64, Cobra H64, Cobra- H128 and CIKS- 1. 
3 .2 .1 RC5 
Much of the inter st in data- dependent primitives came about as a result of RC5, 
published by Ron Rivest in [1]. The cipher was designed to be simple, fast (in both 
hardware and software), and variable in input size, key size and number of rounds. It 
was also a stated goal of the author to highlight the use of DDRs. In fact, the DDRs 
are the only nonlinear component of the cipher. 
T he algorithm is shown in Figure 3.1 where x <<< y is the rotation of x by y 
bits to the left and EB is exclusive-or. RC5 requires a key expansion array, S, which 
is also computed using DDRs. The input is broken into two w- bit plaintext words, 
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A:= A+ S[O] 
B := B + 5[1] 
for i := 1 to r do 
A:= ((A EB B) <<< B)+ S[2i] 
B := ((B EB A) <<<A) + S[2i + 1] 
end for 
Figure 3.1: RC5 Encryption Algorithm 
A and B (where w is a parameter of the cipher implementation) and initially added 
to the first two subkeys. Then r rounds of the cipher are executed where the input is 
combined with the other via an exclusive- or and then rotated by the log2 ( w) lower 
bits of the second input. Subkeys are also added t.o each input . The final values of A 
and B are the ciphertext. 
The algorithm is deceptively simple at only five lines long, but has held up well 
against attack. In [10], the authors showed t hat the rotations used in RC5 help to 
make linear and diHerential attacks ou RC5 impractical for implementations using 
12 or more rounds. In [9], the cipher 's author claims that although there have been 
theoretical attacks on R.C5 (mostly to due the effective limit on the number of data 
bits influencing the rotations), there have been no practical attacks. 
3.2.2 RC6 
R.C6, presented in [9], is a direct descendant of the RC5 cipher and was a candidate 
for the AES . Both the key schedule and the cipher itself are derived from the original 
cipher. In the case of the key schedule, the algorithm is similar in all aspects except 
the number of keys derived , of which RC6 has more. 
The encryption algorithm itself has additional elements. Fixed rotations based on 
the logarithm (base 2) of the size of the data, w, have been added along with integer 
multiplication modulo w. Both of these operations are employed to ensure more data 
bits are involved in the determination of the rotation amount in the DDRs employed, 
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B := B+S[O] 
D := D + S[l] 
for i := 1 to r do 
t := ((B x (2B + 1)) <<< log2 (w) 
u := ((D x (2D + 1)) <<< log2 (w) 
A:= ((Affit) <<< B) + S[2i] 
B := ((B EB u) <<< A)+ S[2i + 1] 
(A, B, C, D) = (B , C, D, A) 
end for 
A:= A+ S[2r + 2] 
C := C + S[2r + 3] 
Figure 3.2: RC6 Encryption Algorithm 
thus overcoming a perceived weakness in RC5. The algorithm itself is given in Figure 
3.2. 
In [30] the authors found that using the chi- squared (x2 ) test , they could distin-
guish the results of the cipher from random data when using up to 15 rounds. They 
present an algorithm for extracting keys which will work in less time than exhaustive 
key search, requiring 2119 plaintexts with a time complexity of 2215 for a cipher key of 
256 bits. The authors also note they detected weak keys in the analysis of the cipher. 
The keys are not enumerated, however they are visible due a large deviation in the 
x2 tests. 
The authors of [31] also use the x2 test as a distinguishing algorithm in an attack 
of RC6. The authors propose a simplification Lo the cipher, removing the whitening 
steps (the calculations of Band D at the beginning of the cipher and A and Cat the 
end), calling it RC6W (RC6 without Whitening) . On this new variant of the cipher, 
they present an attack which can recover the key of an r round cipher using 28·1r - lJ.B 
plaintexts with a probability of 90%. 
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Figure 3.3: The Spectr- H64 Encryption Function [3] 
3 .2.3 Spectr- H64 
In [3], Spectr- H64 is presented as a fast , hardware- oriented cipher wi th extensive use 
of DDPs . The same algorithm is used for both encryption and decryption as shown 
in Figure 3.3. The cipher has 12 rounds with two additional t ransformations at the 
beginning and end of the funct ion. The additional t ransformations are a combination 
of DDPs and inverters that function on groups of two bits. In the case of the ini tial 
transform8.tion, one bit is iuvcrted at the output of the DDP. Ia the case of the final 
transformation, one of the bits is inverted at the input of the DDP. 
Each round of the cipher uses a 192- bit subkey which is der ived from the 256- bit 
key for the cipher via the given key schedule. Of the 192 bits , 32 are added to the 
data via an exclusive- or and 160 are input into the extension function E and used as 
control bits for the DDPs. In addit ion to the DDPs, Spectr- H64 includes a nonlinear 
function G which operates on key and data, the result of which is exclusive- ored back 
into the cipher data. 
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Figure 3.4: The Cobra- H64 Encryption Function [4] 
3.2.4 Cobra-H64 and Cobra-H128 
In [4], Sklavos, Moldovyan and Moldovyan present the Cobra family of ciphers. These 
ciphers are again based on DDPs and are the result of analysis of their previous 
ciphers Spectr- H64 and CIKS- 1 (presented in the next section) . The cipher has two 
variants, Cobra- H64 (shown in Figure 3.4), which has a 64- bit block size, and Cobra-
H128 (shown in Figure 3.5) which has a block of 128- bits. The ciphers each have 
four subkeys of lengths 32- bits and 64- bits, and are comprised of 10 and 12 rounds 
respectively. 
Each round starts with an initial transformation and ends with a final transfor-
mation during which part of the subkey is added modulo- two to the left and right 
halves of the data. Each round consists of a crypt function during which the Right 
Hand Side (RHS) of the data is permuted by a DDP using the Left Hand Side (LHS) 
as the controL The ciphers use DDPs, but do not depend on them entirely to pro-
vide nonlinearity. The cipher also includes a nonlinear function , G similar to the one 
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Figure 3.5: The Cobra- I-!128 Encryption Function [4] 
found in Spectr- H64 which is a function of half the round data and half the subkey, 
the resul t of which is exclusiv ored into the other half of the data. T his is done 
twice, with the LHS and RHS being permuted in between the operations. Finally, 
the RHS is once again permuted via the inverse of the DDP used previously, with 
the LHS data being used as the control once again. Other components found in the 
ciphers arc: I, a permutation involution; II, a fixed perrnutatiou; aud w, a switchable 
fixed permutation. 
T he authors' analysis of the ciphers shows that they are resistant to differential 
cryptanalysis after eight and ten rounds for Cobra- H64 and Cobra- I-!128, respectively. 
They also state both ciphers are resistant to linear cryptanalysis after five rounds. In 
[32], the authors propose implementation of the Cobra ciphers, Cobra-8128, which 
is designed to be implemented in software. In the next section, we look at another 
cipher proposed by Moldovyan and Moldovyan which depends almost exclusively on 
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D D Ps for nonlinearity. 
3.3 The CIKS- 1 Cryptographic Cipher 
In [2], Moldovyan and Moldovyan propo ·ed a new 8- round cipher ba ed on DDPs. 
CIKS 1 was presented as a fas t, hardware oriented cipher. It relies on DDPs for 
their speed in hardware and is designed to lack pre-computation of key scheduling. 
Preliminary analysis of the cipher by the a uthors showed tha t it can easily obtain 
speeds of 2Gb/s and was resistant to both linear and diff r ntial cryptanalysis. 
We chose IKS 1 for the investigation of DDPs as cryptographic primitives for 
three main reasons. First, the ciph r is r latively new, and as such has not been 
extensively tested . Second , it uses DDPs in a more general form, rath r than using th 
subset of DDR fun tions. Finally, the cipher relies mainly on the DDP for nonlinearity 
in the output. 
In this section, we wi ll look at the DDP defined for use in the CIKS- 1 cipher by 
its authors. We will then look a t the other components used before moving on to the 
algorithm as a whole. We will then investigate CIKS- 1 with respect to some common 
cryptographic principles before examining known attacks on th cipher. 
3.3.1 CIKS- 1 Data- Dependent P ermutations 
T he CIKS- 1 DDPs ar designed to be constructed from basic building blocks. The 
most basic block, the P2; 1 controlled permutation , takes two input bits, x0 and x 1 and 
a single control bit cv0 . If cv0 = 0, x0 and .1: 1 are swapped to form the outpu t; other-
wise, they pass through, posit ions unchanged. This simple permu tation is combined 
in layers to make the more complex DDPs that appear in the cipher. 
For instance, in order to mak a P4; 4 , two layers of two P2; 1 blocks are used. 
As seen in Figur 3.6, a "butterfly" pat tern is used to conn t th two layers of 
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Figure 3.6: P4 ; 4 Data Dependent Permutation with Example Inputs. 
permutations. This ensures that bits that are grouped together in the input are 
not continually swapped with each other as they move through the layers. It also 
guarantees that a CV which is comprised of mostly "1"s will not result in a poorly 
permuted output. 
In order to decrypt the ciphertext created using the DDPs, an inverse function is 
required. T his is produced simply by running the ciphertext through the permutations 
in reverse using the original control vector. An example of the ? 8; 12 DDP and its 
inverse, p - 18; 12 are shown in Figure 3.7. Both of the example DDPs shown, P4 ; 4 and 
Ps;12 are strict and have an order of 1. 
The CIKS- 1 DDPs are both fas t in operation and efficient in hardware imple-
mentation. Since the CVs are available at the t ime of the permutation operation, 
there is no setup time required and the time delay is only that of the permutations 
themselves. The hardware cost for the P";"" DDP is given as 4m NAND gates [2]. 
3.3.2 Other Cipher Components 
Although it depends heavily on its DDPs for nonlinearity, CIKS- 1 does employ a few 
other primitives to complete the cipher. Here we present a discussion of each one, 
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Figure 3. 7: P8; 12 Data Dependent Permutation and its Inverse. 
including any design decisions indicated by the authors in [2] . 
Fixed Permutations and Rotations 
In addition to the DDPs used in the cipher , the authors have a lso inclnclecl two fixed 
permutations and three fixed 7-bit rotations to the right. The fixed permutations 
are applied to control vector data and in [2] the authors indicate that this is done 
to increase diffusion (the rela tionship of the effect of changing an inpu t bi t on the 
output defined by Shannon in [12]). The rotations affect both the cipher data and 
the CVs; however , no reason for th ir inclusion is given. 
Two- bit Additions 
CIKS- 1 uses modulo- 22 addition to ombine the left and right data at the end of 
each round. Sixteen of these addition blocks are used in parallel, each operating 
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on ouly two bits of the input data with the carry bit out of each 2 bit block being 
ignored. The cipher author state that modulo 22 add ition was chosen over a full 
32- bit addition to avoid the long carry propagation d lay associated with the latter. 
However. since each addition is isolated to affecting only two- bits of data. it also 
introduces a limit on the propagation of hange within the cipher. 
Key Addition 
Key addition in the cipher is achieved using an exclusive-or operation. This is a 
common way of mixing the key into the ciphertext in cryptographic ale;orithms. The 
authors choose not to directly add in each cipher subkey; they instead first p rmute 
it using a DDP based on the LHS cipher data. In [2] this is referred to as an internal 
key schedule, a way of ensuring the same subkey is not continually add cl between 
key changes. 
3.3.3 Description of Cipher 
The CIKS- 1 cipher is a fast , hardware-oriented cipher, with its principle security 
component being DDPs. It is a block cipher with a block size of 64 bits. The cipher 
is composed of eight rounds, ach with a 32- bit subkey, K 0 , K 1 , . .. , K 7 , for a total 
key size of 256 bits. A single round of the cipher is shown in Figure 3.8. The solid 
lines in the diagram show the flow of dat a and the clashed lines arc control vectors. 
Permutations are labeled n jm, where n is the number of bits permuted and m is the 
number of bits of control. Additional labels of the form Pi ar given to id ntify the 
individual permutations. 
The 64- bit data is split into half for input to the left and right hand sides. The 
RHS is expanded and used to permute the data on the LHS using P1 . The LHS 
data is then expanded, with a portion being permuted using P3 based on the subkey 
data, and permuted using the fixed permutation II1, the result of which is used to 
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Figure 3.8: The CIKS 1 Encryption Algorithm.[2] 
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Input: 64- bit plaintext L I R , where L and R are the 32 bit sub-
blocks of data. 
for i = 0 to 6 rounds do 
L I R := Round(L I R) ; L +-> R; 
end for 
L I R := Round(L I R) ; 
Output: ciphertext L I R 
Figure 3.9: Encryption Algorithm for Full 8 Rounds of CIKS 1 
permute the RHS data with P2 . The subkey is permuted next using an expanded 
version of the LHS data as the CV for ?4 before combining it with the RHS data via 
exclusiv or. Once again, the LHS data is expanded, with a portion being permuted 
using P5 based on the subkey data, and permuted using the fixed permutation I12 , 
the result of which is used to permute the RHS data with P6 . Finally, the RHS da ta 
is add d to the LHS data via 16 parallel modulo- 22 additions, b fore swapping the 
left and right sides at the end of the round (in all but the last round) . The full 8 
rounds of the cipher are defined algorithmically in Figure 3.9 where Round is a single 
round function of CIKS- 1, excluding Lhe final swap. 
The decryption algorithm for CIKS- 1 is shown in Figure 3.10. The 16 parallel 
2- bit addition blocks are replaced with the same number of 2- bit subtractions. As 
well, all other primitives that act directly upon the data are replaced by their inverse 
functions. Other rotations and DDPs remain the same as they arc requir d to build 
identical CVs. The swapping of the left and right sides remains at the end of all but 
the last round. 
3.3.4 Initial Analysis of CIKS- 1 
An initial analysis of the CIKS- 1 cipher was done when looking for weaknesses tha t 
could be exploited . In the following sections, we look at general cryptographic con-
cepts, applying them to CIKS- 1. More detailed analysis of the cipher is done in the 
following chapters. 
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Avalanche Effect and the Strict Avalanche Criteria 
The authors of CIKS-1 presented a brief analysis of the avalanche effect in the original 
paper. They noted that each control vector bit influences two output bits, with a 
probability of swapping them equal to ~· Taking into account the swap at the end 
of each round, they state that after two rounds, every input bit should influence all 
output bits. During the analysis of the cipher, it was found that the SAC criteria 
holds. Choosing random inputs and keys, the data was encrypted over eight rounds. 
A version of the data with a one-bit difference was also cucryptcd. Comparison of the 
different results ·bowed that the number of output bits changed matched a binomial 
distribution with probability of ~ , thereby confirming the cipher conformed to the 
SAC. 
Key Schedule 
There is no key schedule specified for CIKS- 1. The authors note that there is an 
internal key scheduling (IKS) due to permutation P4 , which scrambles each subkey, 
controlled by the data on the LHS of the cipher. This is considered to be beneficial 
to the cipher, as the key scheduling can be done in parallel with other parts of the 
cipher, eliminating pre- computations and thus adding no time d lay due to frequent 
key changes. 
However, the CIKS- 1 paper docs not give any indication as to how these sub keys 
should be derived from the master key. Leaving this to the implcm ntor of the cipher 
allows for the increased chance of using weak keys. For example, the cipher can be 
implemented such that each round uses the same subkey, depending on the IKS to 
scramble it differently for each round. In later chapters we examine an attack based 
on a set of weak keys and show how it can exploit a poorly chosen key schedule. 
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3.3.5 Known Attacks 
In [33], a chosen plaintext attack is presented on a reduced 5- round version of the 
CIKS- 1 cipher. The authors exploit the fact that DDPs have no bearing on the parity 
of the data and the parallel additions can be hown to be clo e to linear in nature. In 
order to cancel out the effect of the first round, they choose the LHS plaintext such 
that the jth bit of the plaintext, Xj, is 0, for all j = 2 xi+ 1 where 0 ~ i ~ 15. This 
ensures that the probability of their linear approximation for the addition in the first 
round holding is one. 
The authors then attack the following four rounds, revealing key information for 
the fifth round. This is achieved by decrypting 236 ciphertext pairs using all possible 
232 subkeys. The resulting LHS data has the RHS data subtracted so that th value 
of the LHS before the fourth round addition is obtained. The parity of this da ta is 
then compared to that of a linear approximation and a record of matches is recorded 
for each subkey. The subkey with the best results is chosen a the last round subkey. 
T he authors calcula te that the attack will succeed in rcvcaliug the iiual round subkcy 
with a probability of 78.5%, with a data complexity of 236 and time complexity of 
265.7 . 
In [34], the authors implemented a timing attack on CIKS- 1. Though designed 
for hardware, the authors note that the cipher can potentially have a weakness if 
naively implemented in software, specifically in single thread d environments such 
as a micro- controller or smart card. The attack presented exploits the case when 
the DDPs are simply implemented as swaps controlled by th CV as a condit ional 
statement such as: 
if (cv = O) 
swap(xl, x2) ; 
In this case the author's show that the time taken for encryption reveals infor-
mation about the Hamming weight of the key when the plaintext and ciphertext are 
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known . The authors also propose an implementation of the DDPs usiug pure booleau 
cxpressious that is immune to this method of attack. 
3.4 Summary 
In this chapter we have given an introduction to DDPs and examples of ciphers 
in which they are used. We then introduced the CIKS- 1 ipher, as introduced by 
Moldovyan and Molclovyan in [2] . 1 his introduction included an analysis of the com-
ponents of CIKS- 1 and known attacks on the cipher. In the fo llowing two chapter , 
two new attacks on CIKS- 1 are pres nted. The first exploits a l· s of weak keys for 
the cipher. The econd is a differential attack that focuses on thew ight of the input 
differentials. 
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Chapter 4 
Weight Based Attack on CIKS- 1 
In [2], Moldovyan and Moldovyan provided a preliminary analysis for the strength of 
the proposed cipher CIKS- 1. The evaluation was done for two of the most successful 
cryptanalysis techniques known, linear and differential cryptanalysis. Using these 
attacks, while making assumptions in the attacker's favour, the authors estimated 
that approximately 264 and 266 plaint xts would be requir d to attack t.he cipher 
with differential and linear cryptanalysis, respectively. In this hapter, we look at an 
alternate approach to breaking the cipher that exploits low Hamming weight subkeys. 
In [33], Lee et al. presented a chosen plaintext attack design d for use on a 5-
round version of the CIKS- 1 cipher. They present linear approximations of three 
rounds of the cipher, based on th parity of the data. The time complexity of the 
attack is estimated by the authors to b approximately 265·7 encryptions. Unfortu-
nately, although this attack can b pplied to all possible k ys, its success is only 
demonstrated on a five- round version of the cipher. The authors propose that this 
attack will work on the full eight round cipher through " anonical xtension," but 
do not explain how this can be achieved . 
The attack introduced in this chapter will also be a chosen plaintext attack. A 
look at the ff cts of the data- dep ndent permutations will be presented, fo using on 
their efl'ecl 0 11 the Hamming weight of the ciphertext. It will be shown Lhal one could 
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exploit th fact that .-ince there is no prescribed way of implementing a key schedule 
for the cipher, there is the potential for a lru:;s of weak keys to reveal information 
abou t. t he firs t or lc-tst mnnd of tl1e cipher. T he attack is then presented which builds 
on this inf rmation to reveal information of subkeys, allowing for a brut force attack 
on the first u bkey using a reduced search space. 
4.1 Analysis of the CIKS- 1 Components 
The following sections analyze the components that make up the entire CIKS- 1 al-
gorithm with r sp t to a Hamming weight based attack. It will look at all the 
primitives us d in the cipher, as well as discuss the problems with not specifying a 
key schedule. Th r will then be an analysis of the weight propagation through the 
cipher as a whole. 
4 .1 .1 The CIKS- 1 P ermutations 
As presented in Chapter 3, the CIKS- 1 cipher uses DDPs, which in turn use a portion 
of key or data to control the permutation of the individual bits of data as they pass 
through the cipher. The CIKS- 1 DDPs are labeled Pn;m, where n is the number of 
bits to be permuted and m is the the number of bits in the CV. For example, th 
2- bit permutation P2; 1 produces an output of the two input bits using a 1- bit control 
vector. If the CV is a 0, the input bits are swapped , otherwise they pass through the 
permutation unchanged. All of the CII<S- 1 DDPs are form d using the smaller two 
bit permuta tions in layers, interconnecting each layer with a fixed permutation. 
T his "butterfly" patterned perrnuLaLiou is used to keep the iuput bits of the per-
mutation from being grouped together ru:; they pass through DDPs. This keeps the 
individual bits from continually being swapped in the same pair, and prevents the 
47 
exis tence of a single control vector that wou ld make the permutation a unity opera-
tion with r specL to data position. A V of all l s would not permute the bits at the 
smaller ? 2;1 pennutatious in the DDPs, therefore the "but.t.crfly ' paLtcru prcvc11tt> 
the entire input passing through the larger DDP unchanged. 
It is important to note that the DDPs in CIKS- 1 have absolutely no effect on the 
weight of th ciphertext. The individual values of the input bits of each permutation 
remain unchanged; only their position is modif-ied . Therefore, the DDP has done 
nothing to affect the Hamming weight of the output data. 
4.1.2 Fixed Permutations 
CIKS- 1 contains two fixed permutations. I11 and I12 . The e permutations n ver 
operate on the actual data of the cipher itself, only the data used in CVs. This appears 
to be done to prevent the user from proc ssing data backward through the cipher to 
reveal information about the subkeys. Sine they perform no direct operations on 
the cipher data it elf, the fixed p rmutations have no eA'ect on the output Hamming 
weight. 
4.1.3 Key Addition 
The su bkey for each round of CIKS- 1 is always added to the RHS data. It is first 
permuted via a DDP and then added to the data via an exclusiv or operation. This 
is a standard way of inserting the k y into many ciphers as it i simple and efficient 
to implement. 
The exclusiv or is one of only two operations used in the cipher where the weight 
of the data can be affected. This operatiou has a probability of chc:mgiug the data biL 
~ of th time, assuming random key inJ uts. A problem aris s when a characteristic 
of the k y is not consistent with random behavior, particularly in th ase of having a 
key with a ignifi antly low Hamming weight. In this case, the majority of the subkey 
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being added via exclusive- or will be binary zeros. By definition, when a binary zero 
is exclusive- ored with another binary bi L, x, the result will I e x. Thus, in the case 
of low weight keys , the Ilarnrning weight of tlH' data is on ly modes tly affected by the 
exclusive- or operation. 
4 .1.4 A ddition 
The only other place the weight of the data in the CIKS- 1 cipher can be changed 
is the parallel addition block at the end of each round. Here, 1G parallel modulo-
22 additions combine the left and right hand side data b fore they are swapped to 
form the output of the round. Each addition operation carri out 16 2- bit binary 
additions, with the carry being ignored. This has the advantage of being efficient to 
implement in hardware, but has the eli advantage of grouping small blocks of data 
together, aHectiug each other iu isolation of other groups . 
If x is the data from the LHS entering the addition and y is the data from the 
RHS, then z i the modified LHS data as a r sult of the addition. The weight change 
in the output, D.wt, is defined as a differen e in the weight of z with re ·pect to x . An 
analysis of the th modulo- 22 addition shows that although there is an influence on 
the weight of the LHS data, there is still a significant probability that it will remain 
unchanged . Consider two-bit addition as shown in, 
( 4.16) 
We can break Equation 4.16 into two equations: 
zo = xo E9 Yo (4.17) 
and 
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Y1 Yo Z J zo 
0 0 .1:1 .'Co 
0 1 X1 EB .'Co Xo 
1 0 X i Xo 
1 1 x 1 EB xo xo 
Table 4.1: Addition output as a function of :1:0 aucl .1: 1 
Zt = x 1 (]) Y1 ED (xo 1\ Yo) . ( 4.18) 
Using 4.17 and 4.18, we can consider the output as a function of xo and x, , for all 
possible values of Yo and y1 . T his is shown in Table 4.1. 
It can be seen from Table 4.1 that the case where y0 = y1 = 0 results in an output 
where the weight always remains the same. Conversely, the cas where Yo = 1 and 
y1 = 0 always equa tes to a change in the weight. In the two remaining cases, any 
change in the output weight is dependent on the inputs for x0 and x1 . Table 4.2 is 
an expansion of thes remaining cases. From the table we can ob ·erve that there is a 
probabili ty of t tha t the output weight will remain unchanged. 
Y1 Yo X 1 xo Z t zo 6 wt 
1 0 0 0 1 0 1 
1 0 0 1 1 1 0 
1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
1 0 1 1 0 1 1 
1 1 0 0 1 1 2 
1 1 0 1 0 0 1 
1 1 1 0 0 1 0 
1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
Table 4.2: Hamming weight change of modulo- 22 add it ion. 
This ana1ysis shows that each 2- bi t aclclition block ha~ a significant chance the 
weight of th lata will be unchanged aft r the operation is performed. In fact , six 
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of 16 possible outcomes result in no change to the weight of Lhc input data at the 
output. 
4 .2 Analysis of Weight Change Propagation 
When designing a cipher , the goal is to create an algorithm which produces an output 
that looks completely random for the set of all possible inputs over the set of all 
possible keys. Ideally, it should not be possible to distinguish between the output 
of the cipher and the output of a random number generator. One quick check for 
this property is to examine the mean Hamming weight of the output of the cipher. 
If truly random, this weight would fit a binomial distribution, thus giving a 64- bit 
output an average weight of 32 [35]. 
Since there arc very few clements of t his cipher which affect Lhc weight of the 
data as it is encrypted , if the weight of the plaintext input is low, the weight of the 
data grows slowly as th data progresses through the rounds, particularly if the key 
has a low weight. This was confirmed by performing five million encryptions for keys 
with weights from one to eight, and a maximum plaintext input weight of six. The 
key and input weights were chosen based on initial testing that showed these values 
constrained the output weights without overly limiting the number of possible inputs. 
The number of tests was chosen to be large enough to highlight the deviation from 
the expected mean without being time prohibitive for testing. 
The test was executed by encrypting a randomly sel cted plaintext with a Ham-
ming weight less than or equal to six. After each round of th cipher we noted the 
weight of the output and calculated the mean overall results. As can be seen in Table 
4.3, the weight of the output grows slowly under these conditions. Figure 4.1 further 
illustrates this by plotting deviation of the expected mean weight against the actual 
mean weight of low Hamming weight keys (keys with a Hamming weight of eight or 
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Figure 4.1 : Deviation of Output Weight for Low Weight Keys over 8 Rounds 
less) over 8 rounds. If fact , with the given input conditions, it can be seen that t he 
mean does not get to within two one- thousandths to the ideal of 32 until the sixth 
round of the test using key weights of 8, which would be easily distinguishable from 
random . 
Another test to see if the cipher output looks random is to do a "goodness- of-
fi t" test. For this, the chi- squared (x2 ) test is chosen to test if the dist ribu tion of 
the output weights matches the binomial distribution as would be expected in any 
strong cipher. We are able to use this test since all inputs, though const rained , are 
chosen randomly (satisfying the requirement of independence) and the outcomes are 
mutually exclusive. 
The first step in the x2 test is to state a null hypothesis. In this case, the null 
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- ---- ------
Rounds 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Key Weight 1 9.80562 15.8245 21.9752 27.3286 30.3768 31.5483 31.8731 31.9652 
2 11.3139 18.4168 24.8688 29.3186 31.2509 31.8091 31.948 31.9767 
3 12.8101 20.7126 27.0043 30.4733 31.6386 31.9094 31.9818 32.0041 
c.n 4 14.3018 22.7463 28.5732 31.1414 31.8139 31.9601 31.9952 32.0018 
w 5 15.8009 24.5132 29.6916 31.5112 31.8963 31.9727 31.9909 31.9977 
6 17.2943 26.0585 30.4913 31.7317 31.9477 31.9882 31.9972 31.9988 
7 18.7754 27.3571 31.0336 31.8431 31.9641 31.9904 32.0005 32.0039 
8 20.2617 28.4782 31.4082 31.9131 31.9769 31.998 32.001 32.0054 
Table 4.3: Average output weight (J.L) with maximum input weight of 6 over 5000000 encryptions 
hypothesis is 
H0 : The sample is from t he binornial distribution b(y; 65, 0.5) (4. 19) 
where b(y; 65, 0.5) is the binomial distribution with 65 trials and a 50% probability of 
success (i.e. , obtaining a '1' bit as opposed to a '0' bit) in each trial. Simply put, the 
weight of the output data from the CIKS- 1 cipher will fit th binomial distribution. 
The degrees of freedom, u, for the test are the number of possible outcomes (i.e. 
number of different Hamming weights for the output) minus one. Therefore, in this 
case there are u = 64 degrees of fr edom. For the test, a probability of error threshold 
of a= 0.05 is chosen , making unlikely outlier cases where the resul t is a fit on chance 
alone. Using these values the critical value for the test, x;,v, is calculated to be 
x2 = 83.675 . This value is used to determine if the sample data is fit to the 0.05,64 
expected data. For this, the x2 value must be calculated , using the formula, 
(4.20) 
where Oi is the observed frequency, and Ei is the expected frequency of the event. 
From Equation 4.20, it can be seen that t he larger the deviation between the 
observed and expected values, the larger the x2 value. The critical value is used to 
determine what result is too large; thus, if the calculated value exceeds the critical 
value, the null hypothesis, H 0 , is rej cted. 
Up to five rounds, the CIKS- 1 ou tput for each key weight up to six and plaintext 
inputs of weights less than or equal to six gives large values of x2 . This indicates 
there is 110 fit to the binomial distribution for this constrained usc of the cipher. Iu 
fact , this property holds for CIKS- 1 as long as the given limits to Hamming weights 
are used, and is the basis for the attack on the cipher presented in the next section . 
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4.3 Proposed Attack 
As shown , CIKS- 1 depends almost entirely on the subkcys to contribuLe to the growth 
of Hamming weight for the data. In fact, when low weight keys are used wi th low 
weight input data, it is possible to distinguish between a random set of bits that 
conforms to the binomial distribution and the output of the cipher. The analysis 
reveals that the set of low weight subkeys, with weight of around six or less, results 
in a weight distribution that is easily distinguished as non- random using the x2 test 
when we constrain the weight of t he input to about six or less as well. This set of 
keys should be considered to be weal< keys. 
Exploiting this weakness, an attack can be mounted on a reduced version of the 
cipher, limited to six rounds, to extract information about the first ·ubkey. A subkey 
is guessed for the first round. Next , a large set (one million in the case of the six 
round attack) of random values for the LHS data after P1 is generated. The lower the 
Hamming weight for each of these, the better for exploiting weak keys. However we 
need enough possible plaintext to complete the test , and therefor a Hamming weight 
of six or less is us d. Each value is used as an input to P4 to permute the guessed 
subkey. The permuted subkey is then run backwards through P2 to generate a value 
for the RHS input. This input is then used to as the control vector data when the 
original generated LHS data is run backward through P 1 to produce an input value 
for the LHS. 
The values for LHS and RHS are then encrypted over six rounds. The idea is to 
produce a value for the right hand input which is close to the actual subkey being 
attacked. A correct guess nullifies the effect of the subkey (thns requiring no constraint 
on its Hamming weight) in the first round , thus leaving only the eA~ects of the last 
five rounds. If the keys used in rounds two through six are low weight, the x2 test 
shows the weight distribution of the output does not match the binomial distribution. 
Pseudocode for the attack (using notation from Figure 3.8) is given in Figure 4.2 and 
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Choose the number of required inputs, /,; 
for all possible 232 subkeys in round 1 do 
for y = 1 to k do 
Create a random value for LHS after P1, L * with weight i ~ 6 
Form Control vector VL 
Run subkey through P4 , call result PSK 
Form control vector V' 
Run PSK backward through P2 to get RHS 
Form control vector V 
Run vector L * back through P1 to get LHS 
Encrypt RHS and LHS over 6 rounds, record resulting weight 
end for 
Calculate the x2 value for the results 
end for 
Compile a list of weights with poor fit to the Binomial Di tribution 
Figure 4.2: Propos d weight based attack on CIKS- 1 cipher 
the full code can be found in Appendix B. 
Test results show the guess d subkey does not have to be exact to give useful 
results. Guessed keys with the same weight as the actual key and those with similar 
weights produce similar results to guessing the actual key. With this knowledge, the 
search space for the first subkey can be reduced based on the result of the x2 tests. 
Table 4.4 is an example of results obtained with the attack1 T his example used 
an actual subkey of all zeros and only 100 randomly guessed subkeys for each of the 
possible weights. This test shows that the search area can be reduced to keys with a 
similar weight within two of the orrect key. It is important to note t hat although this 
test used a low weight .first round key, this is not required. The attack ouly requires 
low weight subkeys in the subsequent rounds to be successful. 
This attack on the 6- round reduced cipher requires approximately 220 random data 
inputs for each of the 232 possible subkeys tested , giving it a total t ime complexity of 
252 encryption operations. This is an improvement over the 5- round attack with time 
complexity of 265·7 presented in [33]. However, that attack makes no assumptions 
1 Calculated using Microsoft Excel 2002 which has the limit on the maximum value iu a cell of 
1. 79769313486232 X 1Q308 . 
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Weight Difference 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
> 1. 79769313486232 X 10. 
> 1. 79769313486232 X 10308 
> 1. 79769313486232 X 10308 
118.52 
69.33 
Table 4.4: Test results for low weight attack 
about the cipher keys, whereas the attack presented here requires that all but the 
first round key be low weight. The probability of choosing a single 232 key at random 
and getting a key with Hamming weight of six or less is given by 
P(Low Weight Key) 
6 en L 232 
i=O 
2.68 X 10- 4 . (4.21) 
The probability of choosing five keys with such a low Hamming weight would be 
far lower. However, not all key scheduling methods guarantee independence. For 
example, the DES key schedule specifies that a single 56-bit key is chosen for the 
cipher and then each 48- bit subkey is chosen as a subset of that key [36]. If a similar 
key schedule was used with CIKS- 1, a single low weight key would result in a very 
high probability of weak subkeys throughout the cipher. If a weak (i.e. low Hamming 
weight) key is chosen in this implementation , then the entire cipher is compromised 
until the next key change, as all of the subkeys are derived from the main key. Even 
more complex key schedules can result in a significant probability of weak keys. 
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4.4 Conclusions 
Due to the choice of primitives with limited effect on the Hamming weight of the 
cipher daLa, th CIKS- 1 cipher dep n I · h avily on the weight of subkeys to produce 
change in the data weight. It has been shown tha t the DDPs, fixed permutations 
and fixed rotations have no effect of th weight of data as it progresses through the 
cipher. The exclusive- or operation depends heavily on the weight of the input data. 
I3y defini t ion it changes the weight of the output half of the time based 011 raudom 
data, but when using low weight data, this probability decreas s. Finally, the two- bit 
·parallel addi tions are shown to preserve Lhc input weight wi th a probability of ~· 
We conclude that there are a cla.<>s of low weight keys which should be considered 
weak keys for the ipher. Analysis of weight propagation through the cipher shows 
that when k ys with weight of around six or less are used as subkeys, we can easily 
detect them by constraining our input data weight and comparing the output to the 
binomial distribution using the x2 test. Using this fact , an a ttack is proposed to 
d istinguish the first subkey by dramatically reducing its entropy. Testing ha.<> been 
done on the a ttack, the results of which arc shown to reduce the search area for the 
first subk y to within a weight of two from the actual weight. In the next chapter 
we look a t anoth r attack on the cipher which involves the Hamming weight of the 
cipher data . 
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Chapter 5 
Differential Attack on CIKS-1 
In this chapter a non- traditional diff'erential attack on CIKS-1 is presented. First 
there is a look at the analysis of Lite cipher 's resi:::;tancc to couveutional differential 
cryptanalysis. The focus then shifts to applying differential cryptanalysis in a new 
way. The attack deals with the weight diHerential rather than the actual specific 
differential in the data itself. Using this technique the data complexity for differ-
ential cryptanalysis on the CIKS- 1 cipher is reduced to approximately 251 chosen 
plaintext/ ciphertext pairs. 
5.1 Previous Different ial Analysis of CIKS-1 
In the original paper on CIKS- 1 [2] , Moldovyan and Moldovyan make the claim 
that the number of plaintext pairs required for a differential attack on the cipher is 
approximately 264 . To determine this number they examine the maximal case of a 
non- zero difference passing through the two ? 32; 80 permutations on the right side of 
the cipher. Based on the analysis of the permutation blocks given, the maximal case 
corresponds to the case with differences using one active bit. 
According to the authors' analysis, the probability that a difference passes through 
the permutations, PDA , for a one-bit difference is PnA(1) = 2- 5 . However, due to the 
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implementation details, it is stated that maximum probability of the difference passing 
through the ? 32/80 permuta tions on the IU-IS of the ciphers is ]J1DA(max) = 2PDA( l) = 
2- 4 , where the added factor of two accounts for the non-uniform distribution of the 
control vectors V ' and V''-
With this approximation and considering that the RHS data passes through two 
?32/80 permutations, the maximum probability of the difference surviving one round 
of the cipher is PDA(f= l ) = b/ DA(max)F = 2- 8 , where f is the number of times the 
difference passes through the RHS permutations. The be t case analysis is done for the 
difference surviving all eight rounds of Lhe cipher , focusing on the RHS permutations 
which the difrerencc will pass through four times. Therefore, we have a probability 
of the difference propagating throngh the cipher of P DA(J= 4) = [pDA(J= l )]4 = 2- 32 . 
With this, the authors use the approximation N DA ~ (PDA(J=4)) - 2 to determine tha t 
the number of plaintext/ ciphertext pairs, N DA, required for a differential attack is 
approximately 264 . 
Since this analysis is done focusing on only the effects of the RHS permutations 
P2 and P6 , it does not account for the effects of the LHS of th cipher. As such, 
the analysis is considered to be a best case in favour of the attacker; the authors 
conclude that the cipher is resistant Lo differential at tack. The following section 
loob a t applying the idea of differentials to a difference in weight and how these 
differences propagate through CIKS- 1. 
5.2 Data- Dependent Permutations and the Prop-
agation of Differences 
Being the main element of CIKS- 1, it might be expected that the DDPs would play 
a major role in the propagation of difFerences through the cipher. In fact , other thau 
the parallel addition, DDPs ar involved in all opera tions of the cipher data. On 
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both sides of the cipher, data is scrambled by the permutations and the key itself is 
scrambled before being added. 
Obviously, if the same control vector used on a DDP is used more than once, then 
the data in each instance will be permuted the same way. When the control vector 
does change, the likelihood of new differences in the output depends on the differences 
at the input. When there is only a one bit difference in the control vectors, the input 
to the P2; 1 permutation that the particular CV difference affects determines if there 
is a resulting difference in the output. The swap at this site is only noticeable if the 
input bits are different. Thus, there is a ~ chance ~hat the output will be unchanged 
by the control bit difference iu the P2; 1 permutation. In general, the probability that 
the permutation's output will remain unchanged by the DDP is 2- n, where n is the 
number of different bits in the control vector. 
The case where there is a difference in the input as well as m the CV is more 
complex. When the CV difference is the control bit for a P2; 1 permutation where 
there is also a difference in one of the input bits, there is no new difference introduced 
in the data. In fact, if both input bits are changed, the output will have no new 
difference. These cases actually increase the chance of a given difference surviving a 
DDP. In our analysis , a one-bit dif·fcreuce input into a ? 32/80 with a control vector 
containing two differences has approximately a 28% probabili ty of retaining a one- bit 
difference at the output. 
5.3 Analysis of Differentials 
If an analysis of the cipher is done not on strict differentials, but the Hamming 
weight of differentials as they pass through the cipher , it is possible to construct an 
attack which has much lower complexity than the one in [2] . Three input difference 
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weights were examined for relationships to fo ur output diffrrcncc weights of inter-
est . These are given in Table 5.1 for one round where (wt( 6.L,_1 ), wt(6.Ri_ 1)) and 
(wt(6.Li), wt(6.~) ) arc the Hauunillg W<'ig!J ts of the diffcn'tln's in Lh<' left all(! right 
halves of the inputs and outputs, respectively. 
Differential ( wt(6.Li_1), wt(6.Ri- J) -t wt(6.Li) , wt(6.R; ) ) 
(0, 1) -t (1, 2) 
(0, 1) -t (1, 1) 
(1, 0) -t (0, 1) 
(1 , 1) -t (1 , 0) 
(1 , 1) -t (1, 1) 
(1 , 1) -t (1, 2) 
Probability 
2- . 
2 - 1.83 
2 7.25 
2 - 13.7 
2 - 13.7 
2 - 7.75 
Table 5.1: Frequency of occurrence of transit ions of interest with random keys. 
Examining the case of (wt(6.Li_I) = 1, wt(6.Ri_1 ) = 1), we · e that the right 
side difference can appear either once or twice in CV V (see Figure 3.8). Taking into 
account both cases, the probability of the one- bit diffcrcucc smviving P 1 is 12.5%. 
Again , d pending on where the one-bit differ nee in the left side occurs, it can appear 
in V' either two or three times. Thus, the probability of the on bit difference on the 
right side surviving P2 is approximately 8.1 %. 
When the key is bit- wise exclusive- or cl with the right side data, there are many 
possible cases to examine. Any case where the absolute differ nee of wt(6.R) and 
wt(6.K) (wh re wt(6.R) and wt(6.K) arc the data and key inputs to the key addition) 
equals 1 could r sult in the output of the key additions beiug different by one bit. To 
simplify the analysis we consider only the most dominant of thes ases, (wt(6.R) = 
1, wt(6.K) = 0) and (wt(6.R) = 1, wt(6.K) = 2), and get a likehhood of the one-
bit difference surviving of approximately 2- 5·7 . Note that P6 acts similarly to ? 2. 
Overall, the probability of a (wt(6.Li_1) = 1, wt(6.~-d = 1) difference leading to a 
(wt(6.Li) = 1, wt(6.~) = 0) is 2- 13·7 . 
The other differential probabilities can be calculated in a similar way. Note that 
in the case wher the difference only appears on one side of the cipher, many of the 
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cipher·s clements do not affect the difference on the other ·ide. These one round 
differenLiab an be chained together to get an overall di.ficrcnLial [or the cipher. 
The notation (wt(6.Li_1 ) , wt(6.Ri- J )) --+ (wt(6.Li), wt(6.Ri )) is used to represent 
the transition in the weight difference of each ide of the input and output pair. If 
we us the 7- round chain of different ia ls (0 , 1) --+ (1 , 1) --+ (1 0) --+ (0, 1) --+ (1, 1) --+ 
(1 , 0) --+ (0, 1) --+ (1 , 1) there is a probability of 2- 4739 that we get th final differential 
assuming the differences from round to round can be considered Lo occur indepen-
dently. Figure 5.1 shows the probability of transitions between all of the differentials 
of interest listed in Ta ble 5.1. 
2-1.83 
Figure 5.1: Probabilities of transitions of interest. 
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count = 0 
r = Number of rounds for a ttack 
Define st ~tte( w,x ) = ( wt(left( w )CI)!eft( x )) , wt( right( w )Wright( x ))) 
s0 := initial state of interest 
s,._1 := sta te of interest after 1· - 1 rounds 
Choose the Jlllltlbcr of required differentia l pairs, k 
for i = 0 to k - 1 do 
Initialize Xo,o and X1,o such that sta te(Xo,o , X, ,o) = o 
Encrypt X o,o for r rounds to get X 0 ,,. 
Encrypt Xt ,O for r rounds to get xl ,T 
for all Possible 232 subkeys , j 0 :::; j :::; 232 - 1 do 
Decrypt X 0,,. for one round using j to get Xo,,.- I 
Decrypt X1,,. for one round using j to get X1,r- 1 
if sta te(Xo,r- 1, X1,1·- l) = Sr- I then 
Increment count[j] 
end if 
end for 
end for 
Result is the set of all x such tha t count [x] = max (count[j ]) 
J 
Figure 5.2: Proposed difFerential attack on CIKS- 1 cipher 
5.4 Proposed Attack 
As shown in the las t section there are certain differentials wi th a high probability 
of occurrence. The transitions (0, 1) --> (1, 1) , (1 , 0) --t (0, 1) and (1, 1) --t (1, 2) are 
the most attractive. When chaining together multiple rounds these transitions ar 
reused as frequently as possible to keep the overall probability high. Although the 
(0 , 1) --> (1 , 2) and (1, 1) --t (1, 2) transitions have a high probabili ty, (1 , 1) --> (1, 2) 
is only useful at the end of a chain and (0, 1) --t (1 , 2) has a lower probability than 
the alternate branch from (0, 1) , (0 , 1) --+ (1, 1). 
To attack the cipher , we first choose a chain of states with a relatively high 
probability of success to use. For example, to attack a six- round version, a fiv 
round chain would be required. The chain of weight difference (1 , 0) --+ (0, 1) --+ 
(1, 1) --+ (1 , 0) --t (0, 1) --+ (1 , 1) could be used with a probability of approximately 
2- 31.86 . A table of high probability chains versus numbers of rounds is given in Table 
64 
5.2. 
Rounds 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Differential Chain 
(1, 0) ---> (0, 1) ---> (1 , 1) 
(1, 0) ---> (0, 1) ---> (1 , 1) ---> (1, 2) 
(1 , 0) ---> (0, 1) ---> (1, 1) ---> (1, 0) ---> (0, 1) 
(1, 0) ---> (0, 1) ---> (1, 1) ---> (1, 0) ---> (0, 1) ---> (1, 1) 
(1, 0) ---> (0, 1) ---> (1 , 1) ---> (1, 0)---> (0, 1)---> (1, 1)---> (1, 2) 
(0, 1) ---> (1 , 1) ---> (1 , 0) ---> (0, 1) ---> (1, 1) 
---> (1 , 0) ---> (0, 1) ---> (1, 1) 
P robabili ty 
2 .;) 
2 - 17.33 
2 - 31.Q3 
2 - 32.86 
2 - 40.61 
2 - 48.09 
Table 5.2: Differential chains for attacking di fferent numbers of rounds 
Next, the number of differenti al pain; that will need to he generated if; cletermined 
based on the probabili ty of detecting the chosen outcome. In the six round example 
above, the output difference would be expected once in every 8 billion encryptions. 
In comparison, if the output difference weight were to occur randomly, the likelihood 
of output difference (1 , 1) would be (;3;? = 2- 54 . Hence, several t imes more than 
8 billion encryptions would be required to clearly distinguish the occurrence of t he 
expected difference. 
When attacking r rounds of the cipher , for each of t he chosen number of differential 
pairs, we encrypt the two inputs, X o,o and X 1,0 , over r rounds labeling the results 
Xo,r and X 1,r· These two values are then decrypted for all 232 possible subkeys of 
round r and labeled X 0,,._ 1 and X 1,,._ 1 . For each result corresponding to a subkey, a 
counter for the subkey is incremented if the weight of stat e(Xo,r-1> X 1,,._ 1 ) matches 
the expected value. 
When all of the differentials have been processed for all of the possible subkeys for 
round r , the subkey with the highest count is the most likely to be the actual subkey. 
The full pseudocode forth at tack is given in Figure 5.2 and the implementation code 
can be found in Appendix C. The next sect.ion presents an experimental verification 
of this attack. 
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5.5 Experimental Verification 
'I'o verify the attack experimentally, an attack has been implemented on a 3- round 
reduced version of the cipher. The chain used for the attack was (1, 0) ----t (0, 1) ----t 
(1, 1), which has a calculated probability of occurrence of approximately 2- 9·58. The 
expected desired output differential (l , 1) should appear in the result for the correct 
key approximately once in every 540 attempts. Therefore, the number of plaintext 
pairs for the test is chosen to be 10000, implying the expected state for the actual 
subkey will occur approximately 19 times. 
T he test was run using the actual key, 32 keys with a one- bit difference from 
the actual key, and 10000 randomly generated keys. All of the k ys with a on 
bit difference from the actual key resulted in the expected output state zero times, 
making them easily discountable as the actual key. T he set of random keys resulted 
in the desired output differential between zero and two Limes, with t.he distribution 
giveu in Table 5.3. However, the actual key returned t he expected dWereuce 22 times, 
making it easily distinguishable from the other possible keys. 
Score Frequency 
0 9760 
1 238 
2 2 
Table 5.3: Frequency of occurrence of desired differential with random keys. 
5.5.1 Attack Complexity 
Although this has only been implemented on a 3- round version of CIKS- 1, it could 
be extended to the 6- round version using the example chain given in the previous 
section. The probability for that chain is approximately 2- 31.86 , meaning one would 
expect the desired ou tput difference once in every 232 tries. To be distinguishable, 
one would waut lhe expected d iftercutial to occur approximately 8 times, giving you a 
66 
data complexity of approximately 2:12 x 2:1 = 235 plaintext/ciphertext pairs. The time 
complexity of the attack includes 235 x 2 = 236 encryption operations and 235 x 2 x 232 = 
268 partial decryptions. 
In fact , it is theoretically possible to extend this attack to the full cipher. For 
this extension, the seven round differential chain (0, 1) ~ (1, 1) ~ (1 , 0) ~ (0, 1) ~ 
(1 , 1) ~ (1 , 0) ~ (0, 1) ~ (1 , 1) cou ld be used. This chain has a probability of 
occurrence of 2- 48·09 and therefore is expected to give the clesir -d output approxi-
mately once in every 248 tries. Again, to be distinguishable from random noise, we 
would want to see the expected output difference approximately eight times, giving a 
data complexity of approximately 248 x 23 = 251 plaintext /ciphertext pairs to recover 
the final round subkey. The time complexity of this Ft.t t.Ft.ck inclndes 251 x 2 = 252 
encryption operations and 251 x 232 = 284 partial decryption opera tions. The remain-
ing subkeys can then be found by stripping off the last round and implementing the 
a ttack again on the remaining rounds. 
5 .6 Conclusion 
In the original paper for the CIKS- 1 cipher , the authors' analysis of the possibility of 
a differential attack on the cipher showed that it would have a data complexity of 264. 
Inst ead of the usual approach to this attack, a non- traditional approach of exploiting 
the weight of differences in the cipher is given in this work. DDPs arc shown to have 
a probability of passing one-bit differences introduced at their input to their output 
28% of the time. This knowledge is then used to create a set of differences that can 
be used to retrieve key data from CIKS- 1. 
Using these differentials, an attack has been proposed to gain key information 
from the last round. As a proof of concept, the attack has been implemented on 
a 3- round version of the cipher. This attack showed that the actual key can be 
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easily distinguished from both random keys and keys wi th ouc bi t different than 
the actual. This a ttack can be extended to six rounds with a data complexity of 
approxima tely 235 plaintext/ciphertext pairs and time complexity of approximately 
236 encryption op rations plus 268 partial decryption opera tions. T he a ttack can be 
fur ther extended again to the full eight rounds of the ciph r wi th a data complexity 
of 251 plaint xt /ciphertext pairs and a t ime complexity of 252 encryption operations 
plus 284 partial decryption operations. 
Although two a ttacks on the CIKS- 1 cipher have been present d, one simple way 
to increas the security of this cipher would be to increase the number of rounds 
used . T his would decrease the likelihood of being able to carry out the attacks in 
this cipher . Since the cipher can still have value, in the n xt chapter we look at the 
implementa tion of CIKS- 1 in software. 
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Chapter 6 
Software Implementation of CIKS- 1 
In th original paper [2], the authors state that the CIKS- 1 ciph r is designed for 
hardware impl mentation. Their original goals were to implement a ipher that is fre 
of pre- com] utabons (i.e., lacking a key schedule requiring the gen ration of subkeys) 
and efficient to implement in hardware. Unfortunately, such spe ifications can also 
lead to algorithms which are inefficient to implement in software, which is the cas 
with CIKS- 1. 
In [32], the authors propose an efficient oftware implementation of the DDP 
based Cobra family of ciphers. However , this implementation depends heavily on 
the addition of a DDP instruction to general purpose processors. The focus of this 
chapter is to investigate an alt ernat method of implementing DDPs, and thus CIKS-
1, efficiently in software. Such knowledge will be useful in implementing other DDP-
based ciphers or a strengthened v rsion of CIKS- 1. 
6.1 Implementing CIKS- 1 in Software 
Each compon nt. of CIKS-1 is designed with efficient hardwar imp! mentation in 
mind. The fixed permutations and rotations are easily implemented using simple 
electrical connections between the components. An addition modulo 22 is chosen to 
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avoid the gate propagation delay associated with addition components using larg r 
words, such as modulo- 232 . T he key addition is a simple 32- bit exclusiv or. Fi-
nally, the main non linear component, the DDP, is designed such that the delay is 
proportional to the number of layers in th permutation. 
T he majority of the operations employed in CII<S- 1 opera.L - at a sub- word level· 
most operations are at the bit level. While this works quite well when implementing 
custom hardware, a large portion of software is written for general purpose processors. 
These pro essors are usually optimized for instructions that process full words of da ta 
at a time (32 bit or 64- bit words for current mainstream processor technologies). In 
order to manipulate data n bits at a time, where n is less than the processor word size, 
many programming languages require verhea.d operations such as masking, shifting 
and temporarily storing bits in ord r to affect only those bit of interest. 
One strategy to avoid the overhead of these operations would be to use arrays 
to contain the data, thus allowing direct access via the array index. This can be 
accomplish d in a. language such as C/C++ by storing each bit in a single char, a 
single byte variable, which is stored in an array. This system has an obvious advantag 
for bitwise dala access, but iL has lhe equally obvious storage in fficiency since an 
eight- bit variable type is being used to hold a single bit of data. Also, some operations 
that can be done efficiently on a worcl h~'"iis (e.g. word- oriented exclm;ivc-or) has to 
be done for each individual bit which is xtremely inefficient. In the following sections 
we look at another method for efficient implement at ion of CIKS- 1 which over com s 
the sing! bit access problem while avoiding wasted memory. 
6.2 Bitslice Implementation of Ciphers 
In [37], Eli Biham introduced a new fast software implementation of DES. Unlike 
other implementations of DES, this on approached the problem from the point of 
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view of trying to fully utilize the entire word length of t he instruction set for the 
processor. To achieve this, an n bi t processor is treated as n on bit processors. 
Therefore, a modern 64- bit processor is used as 64 parallel one- bit processors, per-
forming the same operation 64 times simultaneously. This m thod , referred to as 
bitslicing, allows for single bit operation· to be implemented more efficiently on gen-
eral purpose processors by operating on large numbers of inputs simultaneously. 
To implement DES at a bit level, Biham starts with the cipher represented as a 
series of logic gates. It is a straight- forward translation to obtain a set of boolean 
equations for each component of the cipher. Using bitwise operators, these equations 
arc easily implemeJJtecl iu code. Since a siuglc bitwise operator will by definition 
apply the ·arne operation to each bit in th word independently, this implementa tion 
can be used to encrypt (or decrypt) multiple plaintext inputs simultan ously. 
To be able to use this version of the cipher , the da ta used needs to be stored 
in a non- standard arrangement. T he normal way of t reating data in software is to 
store it in variables with each one holding a single piece of information. In order 
to use the bitslicing technique, n pieces of data (where n is the n- bit size of the 
word form the processor) arc grouped together into an array. T hat array can then be 
transposed such that each value accessed by index i now holds th i th bit for each 
input. Arranged in this manner , the dat a can be input into the new version of DES, 
allowing for parallel encryption (or decryption). To get the final results from the 
output of this code, it must be transposed again into the standard arrangement. 
Biham shows in the paper that this implementation of DES provides a speed up of 
approximately 1.6 t imes over Eric Young's li b DES, a standard fast implementation 
of the cipher , when run on a 300MHz Alpha 8400 processor. He also notes that this 
technique can be extended t o other ciphers. Biham states th approach can be useful 
for most ciphers which do not take advantage of the full word size of the processor. 
He notes that the cipher should have no complex opera tions, such as multiplication or 
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Figure 6.1: Example transposition of input for bitslice implementation 
large substitution boxes, whose implementation would require a much larger number 
of instructions compared to a straight forward implementation. Since the CIKS- 1 
cipher meets these criteria, a bitslice version has been implemented and is presented 
in the next section. 
6.3 Bitslice Implementation of CIKS- 1 
The simplicity of the components used in CIKS- 1 make it an ideal candidate for 
a bitsliced implementation. The cipher is mainly comprised of bit permutations, 
either fixed or dat(L- dependent. The only other operations arc (l,ddi tion modnlo- 22 , 
rotations and an exclusive- or key addit ion, all of which can be reduced to simple gate 
level representations. The next sections discuss the implementation of each operation 
for the bitsliced version of CIKS- 1. 
6.3.1 Preparing the Input 
The bitslice method requires t he user to prepare the input into an unconventional 
format. For n- bit bitslice implementation, the user is required to create an n by m 
matrix of inputs where n is the number of simultaneous pieces of data to be encrypted 
and m is the size of the data in bits. This matrix is then transposed such that row i of 
the transposed matrix will contain bit i of each original input. Figure 6. 1 illustrates 
an example of the transposition where n = m = 4. 
The success of this method is highly dependent on this transposition being done 
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in an effi ient manner. If the amount f time required to t.ran po the data is larger 
than that of the actual speedup , then bit.1-i licing the algorithm provides no benefits. In 
[38], the an t hor provides au dhcicn t. 1 IJd!Jod for t rallsposi ng a 32- by- 32 hit matrix by 
breaking th matrix into smaller sub- matrice that can be hand! d more effectively 
by the processor's registers; transposing those sub- matrices before combining th m 
to form the t ranspos d 32- by- 32 matrix. 
The algorithm starts by dividing the 32- by- 32 matrix into 4 smaller matrices of 
size 16- by- 16 bits. These matric s are transposed such that the secoud half (16- bits) 
of the first 16 words is swapped with Lhe firsL half of these ond 16 words. The results 
of this swap are then subdivided into 16 4 by- 4 bit matrices and grouped such that 
bits 8- 15 and 24- 31 of the first right words arc swapped with bits 0- 7 and 16- 23 
with the second group of eight words. Similar swaps are done on the third and forth 
groups of words. This pattern is repeated with smaller sub- matrices until the entire 
32- by- 32 bit matrix is transposed . In our tests , the 32- bit bit lie version uses a 32-
by- 32 bit matrix. The 64- bit version uses a 64- by- 32 bit matrix that is transposed 
to a 32- by 64 bit matrix. 
6.3.2 D ata- D ependent P ermutations 
To implement th CIKS- 1 DDPs, larger DDPs are broken down into their small-
est single element, the P2; 1 block, a simple data controlled swap of two bits. Thi 
primitive can be modeled as two parallel multiplexers with equations 
xo = (cv A xo ) V (•cv A x1) (6.22) 
and 
(6.23) 
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By the definiti n of the cipher , if the control vector bit is zero then the inputs a re 
swapped, whereas a control vector iu put bit of one allows Lhcm Lo pass through 
unchanged. 
As we can see in Figure 3.6, the DDPs are constructed of layers of the smaller 
P2; 1 permuta tions. Using Equation · 6.22 and 6.23 to form P2; 1 permutations for each 
layer, all that is required to complete the larger permutations is to ann ct the layers 
via the fix d p rmuta tions. Using bitslicing, the P32; 80 permutation is implemented 
using equations 6.22 and 6.23 using bitwis operations on wor ls, thereby completing 
n permutations in parallel for the n- bit bitslice implementation. 
6.3.3 Modulo- 22 Additions 
The modulo- 22 additions can be express d as a series of three quations: 
c = Xo 1\ Yo , (G.24) 
xo = xo E9 Yo (6 .25) 
and 
(6.26) 
where x0 is the Lea..c; t Significant Bit (LSB) and x1 is t he Most Significant Bit (MSB) 
of the LHS, y0 is the LSB and y1 is the MSB of the RHS and c is t he carry bit. 
F irs t , the carry bits can be calculated in parallel by using bitwise "and" on t he 
words holding the LSBs. Then , th final values for the LSB and MSB cau be calculated 
as an exclusiv or of the respective bits together ; the MSB also being exclusive- ored 
with the carry bit. There are 16 parallel additions, so these operations are repeated. 
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6.3.4 Fixed P ermutations, Rotations and Key A ddit ion 
In our original implementa tion of CIKS- 1, the fixed permutations were very compu-
tationally expensive since the individual bits need to be isolated within the data and 
moved to different position. In the bitslice implementation of CIKS- 1, each value 
in the array contains a processor word which is comprised of a group of bits from a 
single position in mul tiple pieces of data. Therefore, in order to swap bits it is only 
necessary to change the order of the groups. This also holds for rotations, making 
each of t bese operations very efficient when operating ou many blocks in parallel. 
Key addition for CIKS- 1 is a simple exclusive- or of the key (permuted via a 
DDP) with the RHS of the data. In the bitslice implementation, this is achieved as 
32 exclusive-ors of the groups of bits. 
6.4 Experimental Results and Discussion 
The bitsliced implementation of CIKS- 1 was compared against two other implemen-
tations of the cipher. The first uses the bitset class in the C++ Standard Template 
Library (STL). This class makes it convenient to access individual bits of the cipher 
data, but it is not written to maximize the usage of the processor 's instruction set. 
The second implementation stores each bit in a char variable. This implementa tion 
allows for easy access to each bit, but uses eight times more storage than required for 
the data and is only effective when operating on a per- bit basis. 
For the comparison of each implementation, 320 million randomly generated plain-
texts are enciphered . The number is chosen as a multiple of 32 since the word sizes 
for the processor being t ested are multiples of this value (32- bit and 64- bit). The 
factor of 10 million is chosen to be long enough to allow for measurement of differences 
between tests without making the tests too long to run. 
In the case of the bitsliced implementation of CIKS- 1, the required number of 
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plaintcxts (32 or 64) arc generated aud added to an array. T he a rray is transposed , 
the data encrypted and then the array is transposed again to get the ciphertexts. For 
the other two implementations, each plaiutext is encrypted as it is generated. Each 
of the tests was run on an Intel Core 2 Duo 2.4GHz 64- bit processor with 2GB of 
RAM. The 32- bit version was compil cl using only 32- bit instruction and the 64- bit 
version was ompil d to use 64 bit instructions by changing the target architecture 
use by the CCC compiler. The total pro essing time is measured using the POSIX 
command time. This command gives the total time for the command to complete, 
as well as the breakdown of the time used by the actual program and the system 
overhead. 
T he initial bitslice version was implemented using 32 parallel encryptions, which 
was considered portable to the majority of processors commonly available which use 
32- bit words. The test consisted of 320 million encryptions through one round of 
the cipher nsing random inputs for both the da ta and key. For the char array and 
STL bitset based implementations, each input was generated then ncrypted before 
moving on to the next. For the bi tsliced version, inputs were gen rated in groups of 
32, transpos d, encrypted and then transposed again to get th output. 
A sampl set of r sults from the testing for each version of the cipher is given 
in Table 6.1. The bitslice version of t he cipher outperformed both the STL bitset 
and char array based versions. By bitsli ing the cipher an ov rall speedup of 130 
times is achieved over the next fastest method, the char array impl mentation. The 
time required to g nerate 320 million plaintexts was measured Lo be approximately 
23 seconds. Taking this into account, the actual speedup of approximately 234 times 
is achieved by the 32- bit bitsliced version of the cipher over the char array based 
implementation. 
Since 64 bit processors ar becoming more popular and th re are now 64- bit 
versions of the most common operating systems available, a 64- bit bitslice version 
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Test T ime 
Generate Plaintexts 23s 
STL bitset CII<S 1 126m l s 
char array CIKS 1 113m 4l s 
Bitslice (32- bit) CIKS- 1 52s 
Bitslice (64- bit) CJKS- 1 39s 
Table 6.1: Elapsed time for 320 million encryptions 
was also implemented . The inputs to the cipher were 64 values (each of size 32- bits) 
for each of the left side, right side and key inputs stored in arrays. To prepare the 
inputs to be used in the bitsliced code, the previous algorithm from [38] was extended 
to fit the word size. To do this, the inputs were split into two 32- by- 32 bit arrays. 
These arrays were individually transpos d and then concatenated into an array of 32 
words. Since the CJKS- 1 cipher itself was written at the word level, its code did not 
need to be changed . 
The 64- bit bitsliced version of CIKS- 1 was tested by encrypting 320 million ran-
dom plaintexts. The time to perform the encryptions was about 13 seconds 1 ss than 
that of the 32- bit bitsliced version. Since a two times increase in speed was not 
achieved , it is obvious that the overhead of formatting the inputs for the bitsliced ci-
phers is a large portion of th overall time. However , it is not larg enough to negate 
the increase in speed of the implementa tion method as compared to the others. 
6.5 Limitations of Bitslicing 
Although these implementations show a significant improvement over the more con-
ventional implementation techniques, they come with restrictions on their use. Sine 
they require 32 (or 64) inputs to be encrypted at a time, they cannot be used for any 
of the standard modes of operation other than ECB or counter mode. Other modes 
require the output of one block into the next, however, these outputs are not available 
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when needed. 
Other modes can be implemented 11s ing non standard methods. CBC can be used 
by using 32 (or 64) parallel chains by choo ·iug the appropriate numb r of initialization 
vector . This mode would be implementing 32 (or 64) standard CBC modes in parallel 
and CFB or OFB mode can also be implemented in a similar way. 
6.6 Conclusions 
The CIKS- 1 ipher was design d for hardware and as a result utilizes many oper-
ations that ar not well suited for general purpose processors. In t his chapter, an 
implementation has been presented that overcomes these limitations. The bitsliced 
implementation of CIKS- 1 has a speed up of approximately 234 times over the nearest 
competitor in tests run. When a 64- bit architecture is used, that speedup increases 
to approximately 425 times. 
The bitsliced version of CIKS- 1 is only compatible with two standard implemen-
tations of cipher modes, ECB and counter mod . However, it is possible to implement 
the cipher using CBC, CFB or OFB modes. In these cases, there are parallel imple-
mentations of th standard modes where the output of each is passed into the input of 
the next ncryption for each implementation. Bitslicing can also be applied to other 
DDP- based ipher::; Lo improve the effi i ncy of software impl m ntation. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusions and Future Directions 
The purpose of this thesis was to investigate the use of data- dependent structures as 
an element in cryptographic ciphers. In particular, the CIKS- 1 cipher was used for 
the research since it was written to primarily rely on DDPs for securi ty. Two attacks 
on the cipher were presented as well as a look at implementing the cipher effici ently 
in software. The following is a summary of the conclusions of this re earch. As well, 
a list of future directions for this research is given. 
7.1 Conclusions 
The primary focus of the attacks presented in this thesis was the Hamming weight of 
the data as it was encrypted. Since the DDPs only permute the data bits, they have no 
effect on the weight of the data. Therefore, if the effect of the other components used 
is similarly limited, there arises the potential to attack the cipher by manipulating 
the data in a chos n plaintext attack. T his approach is used in the weight- based 
attack presented in Chapter 4. 
CIKS- 1 has very few components that change the Hamming weight of the data. 
The rotations and permutations have no effect and the parallel modulo-22 additions 
are shown to preserve the input weight of the data in ~ of the cases. Therefore, the 
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cipher depends heavily on the exclusive or addi tion of the round subkeys to modify 
the weight of the data . Given this fact , keys with a low Hamming weight can b 
detected by choosing low weight inputs. 
Therefore, it is concluded that there is a class of low weight keys which should 
be considered weak keys for the cipher. Through experimentation it is found that 
keys with weight around six or less can be detected by constraining the input data 
weight and comparing the resulting outputs to the binomial distribution through the 
x2 goodness-of- fit test . Testing shows that the search area for the first subkey can 
be reduced to within a weight of two from the actual weight on a 6- round reduced 
version of the cipher with a total time complexity for the at tack of 252 encryption 
opera tions. 
In Chapter 5, a differential style at tack is presented which focuses on the differen-
tial weight of the input ra ther than the individual differences of bits. The CIKS-1 
DDPs are shown to pass a one-bit difference introduced at their input to their output 
approximately 28% of the time. Using this information the CIKS- 1 round function is 
analyzed to create a set of likely differentials with which the cipher can be at tacked. 
These differentials are used to gain information abou t. the subkey of the las t round 
of the cipher. An experimental result is presented which can retrieve the last round 
subkey of a six round version of CIKS- 1 with a data complexity of approximately 
235 plaintext /ciphertext pairs and time complexity of approximately 236 encryption 
opera tions plus 268 partial decryption operations. T his at tack is then extended to 
show theoretically that the entire eight round cipher could be attacked with a data 
complexity of 251 plaintext/ciphertext pairs and a time complexity of 252 encryption 
operations plus 284 partial decryption opera tions. 
Implementing these attacks in software can be inefficient due to the primitives cho-
sen to satisfy the criterion of being fast in hardware. Many of the operations require 
swapping of individual bits which is not well suited for general purpose processors. 
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In testing and experimenting with the cipher , two versions were implemented , the 
firsL using Lhe C+ + STL class bitset and the second using byte arrays in which each 
element held a single bit of the cipher data. In Chapter 6, a third implementation 
method , bitslicing, was investigated. 
Bitslicing overcame the inefficiency of bi t 1 vel operations in general purpose pro-
cessors by treating an n- bit processor as n on bit processors. T his allows bitwise 
operation on a specific bit of n inputs to be calculated in parallel. The bitsliced im-
plementa tion of CIKS- 1 presented has a speedup of approximat ely 234 times over the 
nearest competitor in the test runs when implemented on a 32- bit architecture. When 
compiled for a 64- bit bitslice architecture, the speedup increased to approximately 
425 times. 
Although DDPs can be efficiently implemented in both software and hardware, 
care needs to be exercised in the design of a cipher which uses them extensively. 
Specifically from th P. results presented , elements should be added tha t counteract the 
permutations' lack of effect on the weight of t he cipher data. The following section 
provides suggestions for future directions for the study of DDPs. 
7.2 Future Directions 
This thesis focused solely on the use of DDPs in the CIKS- 1 cipher because it relies 
so heavily on them for its security. Future study of the data- dependent structures 
should be extended to other ciphers, specifically Spectr- H64 and the Cobra family of 
ciphers. These ciphers have DDPs of similar structure to CIKS- 1 but were designed 
based on lessons learned from at tacks on the original cipher. Specifically, a study of 
the weight propagation in these ciphers would help to understand if th y have solved 
this weakness and if so how. 
An attempt at redesigning CIKS- 1 could also provide insight into avoiding the 
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weaknesses of the current design. I<eeping in mind the primary goals of the cipher, to 
be secure while fast in hardware, replacements for fixed permutations, rota tions and 
addition could b e investigat d. This could result in a catalog of components that are 
both fast when implemented in hardware and complementary to DDPs. 
From the point of view of software implementation, the design of the permutations 
themselves could be reconsidered. Although the bitslicing technique worked well with 
CIKS- 1, it has limitations for the mode of operation with which it could be used. It 
would be b n ficial to have a DDP designed such that it can be efficiently implemented 
in software as well as hardware. 
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Appendix A 
CIKS- 1 Implementations 
A.l CIKS- 1 Bitset Implementation 
1 !****************************************** ***************** *************** 
2 
3 Filename: ci k s. cpp 
4 Author: Brian I< idney , P. Eng 
5 
6 DescT'iption : 
7 Stra ight f o r-w a r·d implementation of th e CJJ<S- 1 blo c k cipher using th e 
8 STL b i t se t c la ss . 
9 
10 *************************************** ***********************************! 
11 #i n c lude "c i ks. h" 
12 
13 s tru c t S t a t e { 
14 bitsct < 32> L ; 
15 bitsct < 32> R ; 
16 bitset < 32> l< ; 
17 bitset < 48> v; 
18 bit set < 48> v_k ; 
19 bitset < 80> v_p ; 
20 bitset < 32> s_ p ; 
21 bitset < 80> v_l ; 
22 b i t se t < 32> s - p p ; 
23 bit sc t < 80> v _pp; 
24 bit se t < 32> xor cd; 
25 bit set < 32> key_pc rmuted ; 
26 bitse t < 32> a ft e r_pl; 
27 b i t s e t < 32> aft e r _ p 2 ; 
28 b i t s e t < 32> aft e r _ p 6 ; 
29 } ; 
30 
31 v oid s w a p_bits{bi t set < 32>& plaintext , int x_O , int x_l) 
32 
33 boo ! t e mp = plaintext. test (x _O); 
34 p l aintext [x-0] pl a int ex ~ [ x _l J; 
35 pl ai nt ext [ x_1J = t emp ; 
36 
37 
38 
39 v o id rot a t e_ l sb_7 ( bitset < 48>& input ) 
40 { 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
bitse t < 48> t emp = input; 
temp <<= 7 ; 
inp u t >>= (input . s iz e () 
input I= temp ; 
7); 
88 
47 void rotat e_ l s b _7 ( I itset < 32> & input) 
48 { 
49 bit se t < :32> temp = input ; 
50 temp <<= 7; 
51 input >>= ( in put . size() 7); 
52 inp ut I= t emp ; 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
7 
88 
89 
90 
91 
92 
93 
94 
95 
96 
97 
98 
99 
100 
101 
102 
103 
104 
105 
106 
107 
108 
l09 
110 
Ill 
t12 
113 
114 
void DDP2_1 ( bi tset < :32> & plaintext , int x_O , int x_ l , bool cont r ol_vc c tor) 
if (control_vector = fals e ) 
{ 
swap_ b it s (plaintext , x_O , x _l ) ; 
} 
void DDP4A( b it se t < 32> & plaint ext , int x_O_pos, 
int x_3_pos, bitset <4>& co ntro l_ vec t o r) 
II Do initial contro ll e d bit swaps 
DDP2_l(plaintext , x_O_ pos , x_O_pos I , cont r ol_vccto r [OJ); 
DDP2_l(p laint cxt, x _3_ p os - 1 , x _:Lpos, c ontroLvcctor[ l ]); 
II Swap int e rnal bit s 
swap_bits(p laintext , x_Q_pos + 1 , x_3_pos- 1) ; 
II Do f ina l contr·ol l e1· bit swaps 
DDP2_1( p laintext, x_O_ pos, x_O_pos 1 1 , o ntr ol_vector [2]); 
DDP2_1(plaintext, x_3_pos - 1 , x_3_ p os, cont r oLvecto r [3]); 
void DDP8_12( bitset <32>& pl ai nt ext , int x_O_pos , 
int x_Lpos, bitset < 12> & c o ntro l_ vecto r ) 
II Do initial c ontrolled bit swaps 
for ( int i = 0; i < 2; i++ ) 
{ 
bits t <4> cv; 
for ( int j = 0 ; j < 4 ; j ++) 
{ 
cv . se t(j , co ntrol_v ec t o r [j + ( i * 4)]); 
} 
DDP4_4(pl a intex t , x_O_p os -1 ( i 
II Do the bit swaps 
bitset < 32> temp; 
for ( int i = 0 ; i < x_O_pos ; i ++) 
temp[i] = plaintext(i]; 
* 4), x_O_pos + (i * 4) -t 3, cv); 
for ( int i = 0 ; i < x_Lpos - x_Q_pos ; i+t-) 
{ 
temp[i + x_O_pos] = plaintext[(i*((x_7_pos - x_O_po s + 1) /2)) 
% (x_7_pos - x_O_pos) + x_O _pos ]; 
} 
t e mp[3 2 1] = plaintext [32 - 1]; 
for ( int i = x_7 _pos; i < 32; i + +) 
t emp[i] = pl a int ex t[i] ; 
p la int ext = temp; 
I I Do fina l controll e d permutations 
for ( int i = 0; i < 4 ; i++) 
{ 
DDP2_J (p laintext, x_O_pos 
x_Q_ p o s 1- ( i * 2) 
( i * 2) ' 
1 , c ont r oi_ve c tor [ i + 8]); 
9 
115 
116 
117 void DDP32A8 ( b it se t < 32> & plaint ex t, bit se t < 48> & c ontroLv ec t o r ) 
118 
119 for ( inti = 0; i < 4 ; i + + ) 
120 
121 
122 
123 
124 
125 
126 
127 
128 
129 
130 
131 
132 
133 
134 
135 
136 
137 
138 
139 
140 
141 
142 
143 
144 
145 
146 
147 
148 
149 
150 
151 
152 
153 
1.54 
155 
156 
157 
158 
159 
160 
161 
162 
163 
164 
165 
166 
167 
168 
169 
170 
171 
172 
173 
174 
175 
176 
177 
178 
179 
180 
181 
182 
bits c t < 12> cv; 
for ( in t j = 0 ; j < 12; j -1 I ) 
{ 
cv. se t (j , co ntroL vector [j ( i * 1 2) 1) ; 
DDP8_12(plaintext, i * 8 , ( i .. 8) + 7 , cv); 
void DDP16_32( bit se t <32>& plaintex t, int x_O_pos , 
i nt x_ l 5_pos , b i t se t < 32> & co ntroL ve c tor) 
II Do initial contro ll e d bit swaps 
for ( int i = 0 ; i < 2; i ) 
{ 
bitse t < 12> c v; 
for(int j = 0 ; j < 12 ; H+) 
{ 
c v .se t(j , co ntroLv ecto r [j 1- (i * 12 )]) ; 
} 
DDP8_12( plaintex t , x_O_pos + ( i * 8}, 
II Do th e bit s waps 
bitse t < 32> t emp ; 
for ( int i = 0 ; i < x_O_pos; i ++) 
t emp[i] = plaintext[i] ; 
x _O_pos + ( i * 8) + 7 , cv); 
for ( int i = 0 ; i < x_l5_pos - x_O_pos ; i ++) 
{ 
temp[ i + x_Q_pos] = pl aintex t [( i *((x_1 5_ p os - x_O_ p os + 1) / 2)) 
% (x_15_pos- x _O_pos ) + x_O_pos ] ; 
} 
te mp[ x_ l 5_pos] = plaintext [ x_ l 5_p os ] ; 
for ( int i = x_l5_pos + 1 ; i < 32; iII ) 
temp[i] = plaintcx t[i]; 
pl a intex t = temp ; 
II Do final cont!·ol l e d p ermutations 
for(int i = 0 ; i < 8; i++ ) 
{ 
DDP2_l(pl a in text, x _O_pos + (i * 2), x_O_p os + (i * 2) + 1 , 
c ontrol_v ec tor [ i + 24]); 
void DDP32_80( bitse t < 32> & plaintext, bitset <80>& co ntr o l_vector) 
I I Do initial con troll e d bi t swaps 
for(int i = 0 ; i < 2; i++ ) 
{ 
bit se t < 32> cv; 
for(int j = 0 ; j < 32; j++) 
{ 
cv. se t (j , co ntr o L ve c t o r [ j 
} 
(i * 32) ]) ; 
DDP16_32( pl a intext, (i * 16) , (i * 16) + 15 , cv) ; 
I I Do th e bit swaps 
bitse t < 32> t emp ; 
for(int i = 0; i < 32 - 1 ; i++) 
90 
183 
l84 
185 
186 
187 
188 
189 
190 
191 
192 
193 
194 
{ 
} 
tem p[ i ] = p l a i ntext [( i • (32 / 2)) % (32 - 1 ) ] ; 
tem p [3 2 -
p la int ext 
1 ] = p la int ex t [32 - 1]; 
t emp ; 
II Do fina l con t roll e d permutations 
for ( in t i = 0 ; i < 16; i 1- ) 
{ 
D D P2_1 ( pI a i n t c x t , ( i • 2) , ( i • 2) + 1 , co n t r o I_ v c c to r [ i I 6 4] ) ; 
195 
196 void PL1 ( bit se t < 80> & p l a i ntex t ) 
197 
198 bi t se t < 80> temp ; 
199 
200 for ( in t i = 0 ; i < 24; i -1-+) 
201 t em p [ i] = p l a in text [i + 8]; 
202 for ( inti = 24; i < 32; i ++) 
203 tem p [i ] = pl a in text [i + 24 ] ; 
204 for ( int i = 32; i < 48; i ++) 
205 tem p [i] = pl a in text [i] ; 
206 for ( in t i = 4 8; i < 56; i +) 
207 temp[ i] = pl ai n tcxt [i - 48 ]; 
208 for ( int i = 56; i < 8 0 ; i + +) 
209 tem p[ i] = pl ai n text [i ]; 
210 
211 pl ai nt ex t = t emp ; 
212 
213 
214 void PL2 ( b it set < 80>& p la in tex t ) 
215 
216 bi tse t < 80> temp ; 
217 
218 for ( int i = 0 ; i < 8; i++) 
219 temp [ i] = pl ai n t cxt [i + 1 6]; 
220 for ( inti = 8; i < 1 2; i++ ) 
221 tcmp [ i] = pl a in text [i + 24]; 
222 for ( int i = 1 2; i < 2 0 ; i + +) 
223 tcm p[ i] = pl a in text [ i + 1 2]; 
224 for ( inti = 2 0 ; i < 3 2; i + +) 
225 tem p[ i] = pl a i n t cxt [ i + 1 6 ]; 
226 for ( inti = 32; i < 4 0 ; i + +) 
227 t cmp [ i] = pl a int cxt [ i - 32 ] ; 
228 for ( int i = 40; i < 44; i -1 1-) 
229 tcmp [ i] =p l a int ext [ i + 8]; 
230 for ( int i = 44; i < 52; i + +) 
231 tem p[ i] = pl a in text [ i - 36 ]; 
232 for ( int i = 52; i < 6 4; i ++) 
233 tcmp [ i] = pl a i ntext [ i] ; 
234 for ( int i = 6 4 ; i < 8 0 ; i ++) 
235 t emp [ i] = pl a int ext [ i ]; 
236 
237 pl a int ex t = t emp ; 
238 
239 
240 void p a r a ll e L a ddi t i o n ( bi tset < 32> & lh s, bi t sct < 32>& r hs) 
24 1 
242 fo r· ( int i = 0 ; i < 3 2 ; i = i + 2) 
243 { 
244 
245 
246 
247 
248 
249 
b oo! ca rry = lh s [ i ] & rh s [ i]; 
lh s[ i] = lh s [i] A rhs[i ] ; 
lh s[ i + 1] = lh s [i + 1 ] A rh s [ i + 1] A carry; 
250 void p a r a ll c l_xo r ( bit se t < 32>& lh s , bitset < 32>& rh s ) 
91 
251 
252 
253 
254 
l h s l h s • rhs; 
255 v o id c ik s l _r o und ( s tru ct S t a t e& · t a t e ) 
256 
257 II Form coutr·o l vector v 
258 for ( i n t i = 0 ; i < 7; i ++) 
259 state.v[il = state. R [25 I il; 
260 for ( in t i = 7; i < 32; i ++) 
261 stat c . v [ i [ = state . R [ i - 7 1 ; 
262 fo r ( in t i = 32; i < 48; i + +) 
263 s t ate . v [ i I s t ate . R [ i - 3 21 ; 
264 
265 II Apply P_J 
266 DDP32A8(state . L , state.v); 
267 
268 II Fonn contr·ol vec l.o r v_k 
269 fo t· ( in t i = 0 ; i < 32; i ++) 
270 s t a t e . v _k [ i I = sta t e .I<[ i I; 
271 fo r ( int i = 32; i < 48; i ++) 
272 state. v_k [ i I = s t a t e . I<[ i 32 1; 
273 
274 II Fonn contro l v e cto1· 'ILP 
275 for ( in t i = 0; i < 32 ; i ++) 
276 s tat . v _p [ i I = state . L [ i I ; 
277 fo r ( inl i = 32; i < 48 ; i++ ) 
278 state.v.p[ il = s tate . L [ i - 1 61; 
279 s t ate.s_ p = s t a t e .L; 
2 0 DDP32_48( s tate. s.p , s tate. v_k); 
281 fo r ( in t i = 48 ; i < 80; i ++) 
282 s t at e . v _ p [ i I = s tate . s _ p [ i - 4 81 ; 
283 
284 I I Permute v_p 
285 P L l ( s t ate . v _ p ) ; 
286 
287 II Apply P_2 
28 DDP32.80 ( state . R , state . v_p) ; 
289 
290 II Form Contro l vector v_ l 
291 for ( in ti = 0; i < 16; i++) 
292 s t a t e . v _I [ i I = s t at c . L [ i 1 1 61 ; 
293 fo r ( inti = 16 ; i < 48 ; i++) 
294 sta t e. v _l [ i I = s tat e . L[ i - 1 61; 
295 fo r ( int i = 4 8; i < 8 0; i++) 
296 s t a t e . v _I [ i I = s t at c . L [ i - 4 81 ; 
297 
298 I I Apply P.4 t o k ey 
299 DDP32. 80( sta t e . I< , state. v _I ); 
300 
301 I I XOR round key wi th R ight Side 
302 s t a t e . R = state . R · state . I< ; 
303 
304 II R otat e L eft si d e 
305 r o tat e_ lsb_7 (sta t e . L ); 
306 
307 I I Form v_pp 
308 s t a t e.s.pp = sta t e .L ; 
309 r o t a t e _I s b _ 7 ( s t a t e . v _ k ) ; 
3 10 DDP32A 8( s tat e. s _pp, s tate. v_k); 
311 fo r ( in t i = 0 ; i < 32 ; i++) 
312 state . v_pp[il = s tate.s.pp[il ; 
313 fo r (i n t i = 32; i < 64; i + ) 
3 14 state . v_pp[il = state. L[i 32]; 
3 15 for ( int i = 64; i < 8 0 ; i++ ) 
316 s tate . v_pp[il = state . L[ i - 641 ; 
:.n7 
318 I I P ermute v _pp 
92 
319 PL2(Htatc . v_pp ); 
320 
321 II A7J]Jly p_(j 
322 DDP32_80( s t a t e. R , s tat e. v_pp); 
323 s tat . after_ p 6 = s tat c . R ; 
324 
325 II Add to sides 
326 pantllcl_add ition (state. L , s tate . R); 
327 
328 I I Swap Std e 
329 bi t s et < 32> temp = state. L ; 
330 sta t e. L = s tate . R; 
331 s tate . R = te mp ; 
332 
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A.2 CIKS- 1 Array Based Implementation 
!************ * ***** * *********************~***************** * * * ****** ** ***** 
2 
3 Pi l enam e : ci k .s . cpp 
4 J\ uthor: Bria n J<i clncy , P. Eng 
5 
6 Desc r i pt ion: 
7 S tra i ght forwarcl i mple ment a t i on of t h e C IJ<S- 1 block ci ph e r u s i n g 
8 ch ar arrays t o h o lcl i ncl iviclual b i t s . 
9 
10 * * *** **** * * **** * ******** ** *********** * ** ** * ******** ******** * ** ** ** ********! 
11 # in c lude " c ik s. h" 
12 
13 st ruct S t a t e 
14 
15 c h a r L [32] ; 
16 c h a r R[32 ] ; 
17 c h a r K [ 3 2 1 ; 
18 } ; 
19 
20 v o id s w a p_b i t s( c h a r • pl ai ntex t , in t x _O , in t x _l ) 
21 
22 c h a r t emp = pl a int ex t [x_O 1; 
23 p I a i n t ext [ x _0 1 p I a i n t ex t [ x _ 1 ) ; 
24 p l a int ext [ x_1 1 = t emp ; 
25 
26 
27 void r o tat e_ l s b _7 _4 8 ( chau inpu t ) 
28 
29 cha r t e mp [ 4 8 1; 
30 merncpy (&te mp , in pu t, 4 8 ); 
31 
32 for ( int i = 0; i < 4 8 ; i ++) 
33 in p u t [ i ] = t ern p [ ( 4 1 + i ) % 4 8] ; 
34 
35 
36 v o id r o tat e _l s b_7 _3 2 (ch a r • inp u t ) 
37 
38 c h a r t em p [ 3 2] ; 
39 memcpy(&t emp , in put , 3 2 ); 
40 
41 fo r ( int i = 0; i < 32 ; i++ ) 
42 in put[i] = t emp[ (25 + i ) % 32 ] ; 
43 
44 
45 void DDP2_l( c h a r • p l a in t ex t , int x _O , int x_ l , c h a r c o n tr o l_v ec t o r ) 
46 
47 if ( c o n t r ol _v ec to r = 0) 
48 { 
49 s w a p_bit s (pl a i ntex t, x _O , x_1 ); 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 void DDP4_4( cha r • pl a intex t , int x _O_pos, int x _3 _p os, c h a r • co ntr o l _v ec t o r ) 
55 { 
56 II Do i nit i a l c ont ro l l e d bit swaps 
57 DDP2_l( p la in t ex t , x _O_pos, x _O _pos + 1 , co ntr o l _vec tor [ OJ ); 
58 DDP2_1( p la in t ex t , x _3 _p os - 1 , x_3_ p o s, co ntr o Lv ec t o r [ 11 ); 
59 
60 I I Swap int e rnal bit s 
61 s wap_b i t s (p l a intex t , x_ O_pos + 1 , x _3_pos- 1 ); 
62 
63 II Do f inal c ontro ll er- b i t swaps 
64 DDP2_l( pla int e xt , x_O_pos, x _O_ p o s + 1 , c on t r o l _v e c tor [2 1 ); 
65 DDP2_1( pl a intex t, x _3 _pos - 1 , x_3 _pos, co ntro l_v e ct o r [3] ); 
94 
66 
67 
68 v o id DDPtL 12( c h at· * pl a in text , int x_O_ p os, int x_7_ pos , c h a r * co ntr o l _vcc t o r) 
69 
70 II Do ini t i al con troll e d bit .swn.p8 
71 for ( int i = 0 ; i < 2; i +~) 
72 { 
73 c h a r * cv = co ntr o L vector ; 
74 cv + = ( i * 4 ) ; 
75 DDP4A( p! aintcxt , x_O_pos 1 (i * 4), x_()_pos + (i * 4) 1 3 , cv) ; 
76 
77 
78 II Do th e b it swaps 
79 c h a r temp [ 8 J; 
80 fot·( int i = 0; i < x_7_ p os- x _O_pos ; iII) 
81 { 
82 tcmp [i ] = p laintcxt[(i*((x_7_pos - x_O_pos + 1) /2 )) 
83 % ( x_7_ pos - x_O_pos) + x_O_pos] ; 
84 
85 for ( int i = x _O_p os; i < x _7_p os; iII) II x _7_p os does no t c hang e 
86 p l a intcx t [ i] = tcmp[i x_O_ p os]; 
87 
88 
89 II Do f tna l c ontrolled p ermutatton s 
90 for ( int i = 0 ; i < 4 ; i++) 
91 { 
92 
93 
94 
95 
DDP2_1(p1 ai nt cxt, x _O_pos 1 (i * 2) , x_O_pos ~ (i * 2) I 1 , 
co ntrol_v cto r [ i + 8]); 
96 
97 void DDP32A8( cha r * p laintext, c h a r * co n tro l _vccto r ) 
98 
99 fo r ( int i = 0 ; i < 4; i++) 
100 
101 
102 
103 
104 
105 
106 
c h ar * cv = cont r o l_vccto r ; 
cv + = ( i * 1 2) ; 
DDP8_12(p1aintcxt, i * 8 , (i * ) -1 7 , cv) ; 
107 v o id DDP16_32( c h a r * p laintext, int x _() _pos, int x_ 15_pos, c h ar * co ntr o l _vccto r){ 
108 II Do initia l contro ll e d b it swaps 
109 f o r ( int i = 0; i < 2; i++) 
11 0 { 
c h a r * c v = co n t r o l_vc c to r 
cv += ( i * 12) ; 
111 
112 
113 
114 
115 
001 8_12(plai n t cx t , x_O_po· + (i * 8) , x_O_pos + (i * ) + 7 , cv) ; 
116 II Do the bit swaps 
11 7 c h a r tcmp[l6]; 
118 for ( int i = 0; i < x_ 15_pos - x_O_pos; i 1 1) 
119 { 
120 tcmp[i) = p1aintcxt[( i *((x_l 5_pos - x_O_pos + 1) /2)) 
121 o/c ( x_ l 5_ pos - x_O_pos) + x_O_pos]; 
122 
123 
124 
125 
126 
127 
128 
129 
130 
131 
132 
133 
fo r ( int i = x_O_ p s; i < x_15_pos; i I 1) 
p l ai n t cx t [ i] = tc m p[ i - x_O_pos ] ; 
I I Do final con trol l ed p ermutations 
for ( int i = 0 ; i < 8; i++ ) { 
DDP2_1( pl a intext , x_O_p os + ( i * 2), x _O_pos + ( i * 2) 
·o n troLvcctor[i + 24]); 
95 
1 ' 
134 
135 II Fun c t ·ion: DDP32_80{ b i ts et<32> plrt-.ut e xt, lnt se l. <80> con t rol_vecl.o 1·) 
136 II Implements the CP Box P32l80 . 
137 void DDP32_80( cha•· • plaintex t , char• c o ntrol _vcc to r ){ 
138 
139 II Do initial contro ll ed bit swaps 
140 for ( int i = 0 ; i < 2; i++) { 
141 char • cv = co ntr o L v ec tor ; 
l42 cv += ( i * 3 2); 
l43 DDP16_32(p l a intcxt , (i * 16), ( i • 16) + 15 , cv); 
144 
145 
146 II Do the bit swaps 
147 char temp[32 ]; 
148 for ( int i = 0; i < 32- 1 ; i++){ 
149 t emp[i ] = plaintext[ ( i • 16)% 31 ]; 
150 
151 
152 for (int i = 0 ; i < 32 - 1 ; i + +) 
153 pl a intext[i] = temp[i ]; 
154 
155 
156 II Do f ina l contro ll ed p ermu tations 
157 for ( int i = 0 ; i < 16 ; i++) 
158 { 
159 DDP2_1(pl a int ex t , ( i • 2), (i * 2) + 1 , co n tro l _vcctor[i + 64 ] ); 
160 
161 
162 
163 void PL1 ( char• pl a int ext 
164 
165 char t c mp [8 0 ]; 
166 
167 for ( int i = 0 ; i < 24; i ++) 
168 t emp[i] = pl a intex t[i + 8]; 
169 for ( int i = 24; i < 32; i ++) 
170 t emp[ i J = plaintext [ i + 24]; 
171 for ( int i = 32; i < 4 8 ; i H-) 
172 temp[i] = pl a int ex t [ i ] ; 
173 for ( int i = 48; i < 56; i ++) 
174 t emp[i] = pl a int ex t [ i - 4 8]; 
175 for ( int i = 56; i < 8 0; i++) 
176 te mp[i] = pl a intext[i]; 
177 
178 fo•· ( int i = 0; i < 80; i + +) 
179 p I a in te x t I i J te mp I i ] ; 
180 
181 
182 void PL2( char • pl aintext 
183 
184 c har t e mp[80 ]; 
185 
186 for ( int i = 0; i < 8; i + +) 
187 temp[i] = plaintext[i + 1 6 ]; 
188 for ( inti = 8; i < 12 ; i ++) 
189 temp[ i J = pl a int ex t [ i + 24 ]; 
190 for ( int i = 12; i < 20; i++) 
191 t cmp[i] = p la int ex t [ i + 12 ]; 
192 for ( int i = 20; i < 32; i ++) 
193 t cmp[i] = plaintcx t [i + 16 ]; 
194 for ( in t i = 3 2; i < 4 0 ; i ++) 
195 te mp[i] = plaintex t [ i - 32]; 
196 for ( int i = 40 ; i < 44 ; i ++) 
197 temp[i] = plaintext[i + 8]; 
198 for ( int i = 44; i < 52; i ++) 
199 tc mp[i] = pl a int cx t[i - 36]; 
200 for ( int i = 52 ; i < 64; i-J-+) 
201 te mp[i] = pl a intext[i] ; 
96 
202 for ( int i = 64 ; i < 8 0; i + +) 
203 tc rnp [ i] = plaint c xt [ i ] ; 
204 
205 for (int i = 0; i < 80; i 1-1) 
206 p l ai n text[i] = tcmp[i] ; 
207 
208 
209 void parall c l_addition ( c har* lhs, c h a r * rh s ) 
210 
for ( int i = 0; i < 32; = i + 2 ) 
{ 
c har c arry = lh ~[i ] & rhs[i] ; 
lh s[ i] = lh s [i] • rh s[i ]; 
211 
212 
213 
214 
215 
216 
217 
218 
219 
220 
221 
222 
223 
lh s [i + 1] = lh s [i -1- 1] • rh s [i -\- 1] • c ar r y; 
void parallel_xor ( char* lhs , char * rh s ) 
224 
for ( inti 
I h s [ i J 
0 ; i < 3 2; i -I-+) 
lh s [i ] · rhs[i ]; 
225 void c iksLr ou nd ( st ruct State& s tat e ){ 
226 
227 c har v [ 4 8]; 
228 II Form c ontro l ve c tor· v 
229 for ( i n t i = 0 ; i < 7 ; i -\--\-) 
230 v[ i ] = statc.R[25 -\- i]; 
231 for ( int i = 7; i < 32 ; i++ ) 
232 v [ i J = stat c . R [ i - 7 J ; 
233 for ( inti = 32 ; i < 48; i-1--1-) 
234 v [ i J = s tate . R [ i - 3 2 J ; 
235 
236 II Apply P_l 
237 DDP32A8(statc.L, v) ; 
2::l8 
239 II Form c ont r ol v e ctor v_k 
240 c har v _k [ 4 8 J ; 
241 for ( int i 0 ; i < 32; i++) 
242 v _k [ i ] st a t c . K [ i ] ; 
243 for ( int i 32; i < 48; i -H -) 
244 v _k [ i J s t ate . K [ i 3 2 J ; 
245 
246 II Form c ontrol v ec tor v_p 
247 char v_p [ 8 0]; 
248 for ( int i 0; i < 32 ; i++) 
249 v - P [ i j = stat c . L [ i ]; 
250 for ( int i = 32; i < 48; i ++) 
251 v_p[i] = state.L[i- 16]; 
252 char s _p [32] ; 
253 memcpy(s_p, state .L, 32); 
254 DDP32A8( s _p, v_k); 
255 
256 
257 
258 
for ( int i 
v_p [ i J 
48; i < 80; i++) 
s_p[i 48]; 
259 I I Permute v_p 
260 PL1(v_p) ; 
261 
262 II Apply ?_2 
263 D DP32_80( s tate .R, v_p); 
264 
265 I I Form Contro l v e ctor v _I 
266 char v_ l [80]; 
267 for ( i nt i 0; i < 16 ; i++ ) 
268 v _I [ i J s t at c . L [ i -\- 1 6 J ; 
269 for ( i nt i 16 ; i < 48; i -1--1-) 
97 
270 
271 
272 
273 
v _I I i J 
fo r ( i 11 t i 
v _I I i J 
s tat e. Lii - 16]; 
48; i < 80; i 1-+) 
s tat e .Lii - 48]; 
274 II Apply P_4 i,o k e y 
275 DDP32_80( s tate. 1<, v _I ); 
276 
277 II XOR ,-o und k ey with R i ght Side 
278 parallel_xor (state. R , stat e .K); 
279 
280 II Rotate L e ft side 
281 rotate_lsb_7_32(state.L) ; 
282 
283 I I Form v_pp 
284 c h a r v _ppl80] ; 
285 c h a 1· s_ppi32 J; 
286 memcpy(s _p p, state. L , 32); 
287 rotate _l s b_7 _48 ( v_k) ; 
288 DDP32_48( s_pp , v _k) ; 
289 for ( i11t i = 0 ; i < 32; i++) 
290 v_ppliJ = s_pp l iJ; 
291 fo r ( i11t i = 32; i < 64; ill) 
292 v_ppliJ = s t atc. L ii - 32]; 
293 fo r ( i 11 t i = 6 4 ; i < 8 0 ; i ++) 
294 v_ppliJ = s tate . L i i - 641; 
295 
296 I I P ermute v _pp 
297 P L 2(v_pp); 
298 
299 II Apply P_6 
300 DDP32_ O( s tatc . R, v _pp) ; 
301 
302 I I A del t o s i cl e s 
303 para l l e Laddit i on(state.L, s tatc. R) ; 
304 
305 I I SwCLp si d e 
306 c h a r t emp 132 1; 
307 memcpy(temp , s tate.L , 32); 
308 
309 fo •· ( i11t i = 0 ; i < 32 ; i ++) 
310 
311 
3 12 
313 
314 
s tat e. Lii1 
statc . RiiJ 
s tat e .RI i 1; 
temp I i 1 ; 
98 
A.3 CIKS- 1 Bitsliced Implementation 
1 /************************************** ************************************ 
2 
3 Filename : c iks. cpp 
4 Autho1· : Brian J<iclney , P.Eng 
5 
6 D e s cription: 
7 Bitsl ice cl implem e ntat i on of the C/J<S- 1 block c ipher. 
8 
9 *************************************** ***** ********** **** *********** * * * * *! 
10 # inc lude "c i ks.h" 
11 # incl ud e "bitutil . h" 
12 
13 stat i c in I in c void DDP32_80 ( uns igned long* x , unsigne d long* c ) 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
uns igned long temp [ 3 2] ; 
II Layer n 
t emp [OJ 
temp [ 1 J 
temp [2 ] 
temp [ 3 ] 
temp [ 4 ] 
temp [ 5] 
temp [ 6 J 
temp [7] 
temp [ 8] 
temp [9] 
temp[lO] 
temp [ 11] 
temp[l2] 
temp [ 13] 
temp [ 14] 
temp [ 15] 
temp [l 6] 
temp[l7] 
temp [ 18] 
temp[l9] 
temp[20] 
temp [21] 
temp[22] 
temp [23] 
temp [24] 
tcmp(25] 
temp (26] 
temp [27] 
temp (28J 
temp (29] 
temp(30J 
temp [ 31] 
(c[OJ & x(O]) I ( - c(O] & x ( l]) ; 
( - c [O] & x[O]) I ( c (OJ & x(l]) ; 
(c[ l] & x[2 ] ) I (- c[l ] & x[3]); 
(-c[l] & x[2]) I (c[l] & x [ 3]) ; 
(c[4] & x(4]) I ( -c[4] & x (5]); 
Cc[4] & x(4]) I (c[4] & x ( 5 ] ); 
(c[5] & x[6]) I ( - c[5] & x[7 ] ); 
( - ci5J & x[6J) I (ci5J & x(7]); 
(cl l 2] & xiS]) I ( - ci12J & xi9J); 
( - cll2] & x [8]) I (c[l2] & xl9]); 
(cl l 3] & x[ JO ]) I (-cll3] & xl11 ] ); 
( - c [l 3] & x llO J) I ( c ll 3J & xlll]); 
(cl 1 6] & x( l2 ]) I ( - c ll 6) & x( l3] ) ; 
c- c[l6J & xl 12 ]) 1 (ci16J & x(13J); 
(cl l7 ] & xl l4 ]) I ( - cl 17] & x(15]); 
( - cll7] & x[ l4 ]) I (c(l7] & xl l 5]); 
(c l32] & xl l6 ]) I Cc[32J & xll7]); 
(-c[32] & xll6]) I (c[32] & xll7 ] ); 
(c i33J & x( l 8]) I (-c[33) & x[19]); 
( - c(33J & xll8] ) I ( c [33J & xll9]); 
(cl36] & x[20)) I ( - c [36) & x(21]); 
( - cl36) & xl20)) I (cl36] & x[2 1 ]); 
(cl37] & xl22]) I (-c [37) & x[23]) ; 
(-cl37 ] & xl22]) I (cl37] & x(23)) ; 
(c (4 4) & x[24)) I (- c [44) & x(25]); 
(-cl44] & x(24]) I (cl44) & xl25)); 
(c[45] & xl26]) I ( - cl45] & x[27]); 
( - cl45] & x[26]) I (cl45] & x[27]); 
(cl48] & x(28 ) ) I ( - c(48) & x [29]); 
( - c[48] & xl28]) I (c(48] & xl29]); 
(c l4 9] & x[30]) I (-c[49 ] & x[3 1]); 
(-cl49] & xl30]) I (c(49] & x(3 1]); 
II Layer 1 {P4 -4 butte1·jlies) 
for ( i nt i = 0; i < 32; i i + 4) 
x [ i ] = temp [ i ] ; 
x I i + 1] temp ( i + 2] ; 
xI i + 2] temp [ i + 1] ; 
xli + 3] = temp l i + 3]; 
I I Ln ye1· 2 
temp I 0) ( c [ 2 ] & x I 0] ) I (- c [ 2] 
templlJ c- c(2] & x [OJ) I (c(2] 
temp [ 2] ( c [ 3] & x [ 2)) I (- c I 3] 
tempi3J (-c[3] & x[2]) I (c(3] 
temp(4) (c(6] & x[4]) I (-cl6) 
& X [ 1 I) ; 
& X I 1 I ); 
& X [ 3)); 
& X [ 3)); 
& X 15]); 
99 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
92 
93 
94 
95 
96 
97 
98 
99 
100 
101 
102 
103 
104 
105 
106 
107 
108 
109 
llO 
ll1 
ll2 
113 
ll4 
115 
116 
ll7 
ll8 
ll9 
120 
121 
122 
123 
124 
125 
126 
127 
128 
129 
130 
131 
132 
133 
templ5] 
templ6] 
tempi7J 
temp I 8] 
temp 19] 
temp I 1 OJ 
temp I 1 1] 
templ 12] 
templ l 3] 
temp I 14] 
templl5] 
temp I 16 ] 
templ 1 7 ] 
tem p I 18] 
templ 19 ] 
temp 120] 
temp I 21] 
tem p 122] 
templ23 ] 
templ24 ] 
templ25 ] 
templ26 ] 
templ27 ] 
templ28] 
templ29] 
templ30] 
temp 13 1 ] 
c · cl6 ] & xl4]) I (c iG J & xl5]); 
( c i7J & xi6J) 1 c·c i7J & xi7J) ; 
c · ci7 J & xi6Jl 1 (ci7J & xi7J); 
(cll4 ] & xi8 J ) 1 c·cl l 4J & xi9J); 
c · cl l 4] & xi8J) 1 (c l l4 J & xi9J); 
(cl15] & xl10]) I c·c ll5] & xl11]); 
(-cl15] & xl l O]) I (c l15] & xll 1] ); 
(c l l8J & xll2J) 1 c · ci18 J & xi13J); 
c·c l18] & x l l 2J) 1 (c ll8J & xll3J); 
(cl l 9J & xll4]) 1 c· ci19J & xll5J); 
('cll9] & xll4]) I (cll9] & xll5]); 
(ci34J & x l l61) 1 c·cl341 & xi17J); 
('cl34] & xl 16]) I (c l341 & xll7]); 
(c l351 & xl l 8]) 1 c·cl351 & xll9]); 
('cl35] & xl 181) I (c l351 & xll9]); 
(c i38J & xi20]) 1 c· ci38 J & xl21]); 
('cl38] & x l20]) I (ci38J & xl211); 
(c l391 & xi22J) 1 c· ci39J & xi23J); 
c· ci39J & x l 221) 1 (c i39J & xi23J) ; 
(cl461 & xl24]) I ('cl461 & xl251); 
('cl46] & xl241) I (cl4 6) & xl251); 
(cl47] & xi26J) 1 c·cl47] & xl27]); 
('cl471 & xl26]) I (cl 471 & xl271); 
(ci501 & xl28]) 1 c·ci5 0] & xl2 91) ; 
c·ci501 & xl28]) 1 (ci5 0J & xi29J); 
(cl51] & xi30J) 1 c·cl51] & xi3 IJ) ; 
('cl5 11 & xl30]) I (cl5 11 & xl31]); 
II Layer 3 {?8. 12 butt erfli es) 
fo r ( int i = 0; i < 32; i i + 8) 
{ 
x I i J = temp I i 1 ; 
x li + 1] = templi + 41; 
x l i + 21 = tcmpli + 1]; 
xl i + 31 = temp l i + 5]; 
xl i + 4 ] = temp l i + 2]; 
xli + 5] = templi + 61; 
xl i + 6] = templi + 3]; 
xl i + 7] = templi + 7 ] ; 
I I Layer 4 
temp I 01 ( c I 8] & x I 0]) I (- c I 8] & x I 1 ) ; 
temp I 1 ] ( - c I 8] & x I 0]) I ( c I 8] & x I 1 ) ; 
temp I 21 ( c I 9] & xI 2]) I (- c I 9] & xI 3 ) ; 
temp I 3] ( - c 19 1 & x I 2] ) I ( c I 91 & x I 3 ) ; 
temp I 4] ( c 11 0] & x 14] ) I (- c 11 0] & x 5] ) ; 
templ51 c-c l10] & x i 4J) I ( ci 101 & X 5]); 
templ6] (c l11 ] & xi6J) I (-cl111 & x 7] ); 
tcmpl71 c·c l 111 & xi6J) I (cl1l] & X 71 ) ; 
templ81 ( c l20] & xl8 1) I ('ci201 & x 9] ); 
temp I 91 ( - c I 2 0 ] & x I 8 1 ) I ( c I 2 01 & x 9 ] ) ; 
templl01 (c l21 ] & xllO]) I c· cl21 ] & xll1]); 
templ 11 1 c·cl2l] & xl l 0 1) I (cl21 ] & xlll]); 
temp I 1 2] ( c 12 2 ] & x I 1 21 ) I (- c [ 2 21 & x [ 1 3]) ; 
tem p [ 131 (' c [ 2 21 & x [ l 2]) I ( c [ 2 2] & x [ 1 3]); 
temp [ 1 4 J ( c [ 2 3 J & x [ 1 41) I (- c [ 2 3] & x [ 1 5] ) ; 
temp[ 15] ('c[23] & x[ 1 4]) I (c [23] & x[151); 
temp I 1 6] ( c [ 4 0 J & x [ 1 6 J ) I (- c [ 4 0] & x [ 1 7]) ; 
templ 1 7] ('c [401 & x[ l 6]) I (c[40] & x[17]); 
temp [18 1 ( c [ 4 1 ] & x [ 1 81) I (- c [ 4 1] & x I 1 9]) ; 
temp [ 1 91 (' c [ 4 1] & xI 1 8 J) I ( c [ 4 1] & x [ 1 9]); 
tcmp[201 (c [42 1 & x [20 1) 1 c·c[42J & x[21J); 
templ2 11 ('c[421 & xi2D1) I (c[42] & x[2 1 ]); 
templ221 (c [43 1 & x [22]) 1 c-c[43J & x[23J); 
tem p [ 2 3 J (' c [ 4 31 & x [ 2 2]) I ( c I 4 31 & x [ 2 3] ) ; 
temp I 2 41 ( c [52] & x [ 2 4 J ) I (- c [ 5 21 & x [ 2 5] ) ; 
temp[251 ('c[521 & x[241) I (cl52 1 & x[25]); 
100 
134 
135 
136 
137 
138 
139 
140 
141 
142 
143 
144 
145 
146 
147 
148 
149 
150 
151 
152 
153 
154 
155 
156 
157 
158 
159 
160 
161 
162 
163 
164 
165 
166 
167 
168 
169 
170 
171 
172 
173 
174 
175 
176 
177 
178 
179 
180 
181 
182 
183 
184 
185 
186 
187 
188 
189 
190 
191 
192 
193 
194 
195 
196 
197 
198 
199 
200 
201 
temp[26] ( c [53] & X [26]) I ( - c [5 3 J & X [27]) ; 
temp[27 ] c c [53] & X [26]) I ( c [5 3 1 & X [27 ] ) ; 
temp [28] ( c [54 J & X [28]) I ( - c [54 J & X [2 9 ] ) ; 
temp [29] c-c[54] & x[28] ) I ( c [54 J & X [29 1) ; 
temp[30I 
- ( c [55 J & X [30]) I ( - c I"" J & X [3J)) ; 
temp 13 1 I Cc [55] & X 1301) I ( c 1551 & X 13 1 I) ; 
II Layer 5 ( P16_32 butterflie s ) 
for ( in t i = 0; i < 32; i i + 1 6 ) 
X Ii I = tem p [ i J; 
X I i + 1 J = temp [ i + 8] ; 
X I i + 2] = tem p I i + 1 I ; 
X [ i + 3 ] = temp I i + 9] ; 
X I i + 4] = temp I i + 2 1; 
X [ i + 5] = tem p [ i + 10 ]; 
X I i + 6] = temp [ i + 3]; 
X [ j + 7] = tem p [ i + 1 1 ]; 
x[ i + 81 = temp[ i + 4 J ; 
X [ i + 9] = temp[ i + 1 2]; 
X [ j + 1 OJ = temp I i + 5]; 
X [ i + 1 1 J = temp [ i + 13]; 
X I i + 1 2] = temp I i + 6 I; 
X [ i + 13] = temp I i + 1 4]; 
X I i + 1 41 = temp [ i + 7]; 
X I i + 1 5] = tem p [ i + 1 5]; 
I I Layer 6 
tem p[O] (c[24l & x i O] ) I c- c [24l & x l1l); 
temp [ 1] (- c [2 4 I & x [ 0 ] ) I ( c 12 4 I & x 11]); 
temp [2] ( c [ 2 5] & x [ 2]) I (- c [ 2 5 J & x [3 J ) ; 
temp [3 J ( - c 12 5 J & x [ 2]) I ( c [2 5] & x [3 J ) ; 
temp [4J (c [26J & xi4J ) 1 c-ci26J & xi5J}; 
temp[5] (-c [26] & x[4]) I (c [26l & xl5l); 
tern p [6] ( c [ 2 7] & x [ 6] } I (- c [2 7 I & x 17] ) ; 
tern p [ 7] C c [2 7 I & x [ 6 ]) I ( c [2 7 I & x [ 7 J ) ; 
tern p [ 8] ( c [2 81 & x [ 8 I } I C c [2 81 & x [ 91 ) ; 
temp[91 ( - c[281 & x[8 ] } I (c [28 ] & x l9l}; 
temp [10] (cl291 & xl 1 0]} I ( - c [291 & xl1 1]); 
temp 111] (- c [ 2 9 J & x 11 0 J) I ( c 12 9 J & x 11 1 ]) ; 
temp [ 1 21 ( c [ 3 0 J & x [ 1 2]) I (- c 13 0 1 & x 11 31 ) ; 
temp [1 31 ( - c [ 3 0 J & x 11 2 I ) I ( c 13 0 1 & x 11 3] ) ; 
temp [1 4 I ( c [3 11 & x [ 1 41 } I ( - c [ 3 1 ] & x 11 51 ) ; 
temp[15l c-c[31 1 & x[14]) 1 (c[311 & x[15l) ; 
temp [161 ( c [ 5 61 & x [ 1 61) I (- c [56) & x [ 1 7 J); 
temp[ 1 7 ) (-c[56 ) & xl 1 61} I (cl56) & xl17)} ; 
tcm p [ 1 8) ( c [ 5 71 & x [ 1 8 I ) I ( - c [5 7) & x [ 1 9 I ) ; 
templ 1 91 c-cl571 & xl181) 1 (c[57 1 & xl19l} ; 
tempi20J (c[58J & x[201) 1 c- ci58 J & xl2 1l } ; 
templ2 1 l c-c [58 J & x[20 1) 1 (c[58 ) & xl2 11 ) ; 
tern p [2 2 J ( c 15 91 & x 12 21 ) I C c 15 9 1 & x [2 3 ]) ; 
tern p [2 3 1 ( - c 15 9 1 & x 12 2 1 ) I ( c [ 5 9 1 & x [2 31 ) ; 
temp[24 1 (c[60I & x l24l) 1 c- c[601 & x[251) ; 
t emp[251 c-c[6D 1 & x[241} 1 (c[601 & x[25J) ; 
temp [ 2 6) ( c 161 I & x 12 6]) I ( - c [ 61) & x [ 2 7)) ; 
temp 12 7 ) ( - c [ 6 1) & x 12 6) ) I ( c [ 6 1) & x [ 2 7 J ) ; 
temp[281 (c l62 l & x[28 J) 1 c- cl621 & x[29 J ) ; 
templ291 c-c i62J & x[28]) 1 ( c[621 & xl291) ; 
tempi3 DI (ci63 J & x[3o J ) 1 c- c[63 J & x[3ll} ; 
temp[3 1l c - c[63J & xi30J) 1 (c[63J & xi31J} ; 
II Layer 7 {P32_80 butt e rflies} 
for ( int i = 0 ; i < 16; i++ ) 
{ 
x [ i * 2) = tem p I i ] ; 
x [(i * 2) + 1] = tcmp[i + 16 ] ; 
101 
202 
203 
204 
205 
206 
207 
208 
209 
210 
211 
212 
213 
214 
215 
216 
217 
218 
219 
220 
221 
222 
223 
224 
225 
226 
227 
228 
229 
230 
231 
232 
233 
234 
235 
236 
237 
238 
239 
240 
24 1 
242 
243 
244 
245 
II Laye1· 8 
temp[O] 
temp [ 1 J 
temp [2] 
temp [ 3] 
temp[4] 
temp [5] 
temp[6] 
temp [7] 
temp[8] 
temp [9] 
temp [10] 
tem p [ l 1] 
temp[ 1 2] 
temp[ l 3] 
temp[14] 
temp [l5] 
temp[l6] 
temp[17] 
temp [ 18] 
temp[19] 
temp [20] 
temp[21] 
temp[22] 
temp[23] 
temp [24] 
temp[25] 
temp [26] 
temp[27] 
temp [28] 
temp [29] 
temp [30] 
temp[3 1] 
(c[64] & x[OJ) I (-c [64] & x[ l ]); 
(-c[64] & x[O]) I (e [64] & x [l ]); 
(c[65] & x[2 ] ) I (-c[65] & x[3]); 
(-c[65] & x[2]) I (c[65] & x[3 ] ) ; 
(c[66 ] & x[4]) I (-c[66] & xl5]); 
(-c[66] & x[4 ] ) I (c[66J & xl5]); 
(c[67] & x[6]) I ("c[67] & x[7]); 
( - c[67] & x[6]) I (c[67] & x[7]); 
(c[68J & x[8]) I ( - c[68] & x[9]); 
(-c [68] & x[8 ] ) I (c[68] & x[9]); 
(c [69] & x[ l OJ) I ( - cl69] & x[l l ]); 
( - c[69] & x!lOJ) I (c[69] & x[l l ]); 
(c[70] & x[ 1 2]) I (-c[70] & x[l3]) ; 
( - c[70J & x[ l 2]) I (c[70] & x[l3]); 
(c[71) & x[14)) I (-c[71) & x[l5 ) ); 
( - c [7 1) & x[14]) I (c[71) & x[15 ] ); 
(c[72) & x[ l 6]) I ( - c[72) & x[l7)) ; 
(-c[72) & x[ l 6)) I (c[72) & x [17]); 
(c[73] & x[18)) I (-e[73) & x [ l9]) ; 
( - c [73 ] & x [l 8 ) ) I (c[73] & x[ l 9 ) ) ; 
(c[74) & x[20 ) ) I ( - c[74] & x[2 1] ); 
( - c[74] & x[20]) I (c[74) & x[2 1 )) ; 
(c[75] & x[22)) I ( - c[75] & x[23)) ; 
(-c[75) &x[22]) I (c[75] &x[23)); 
(c [76] & x[2 4)) I ( - c [76] & x[25)); 
( - c[76) & x[24)) I (c[76] & x[25)); 
(c[77) & x[26)) I (-c[77) & x[27]) ; 
( - e[77) & x[26]) I (e[77] & x[27)); 
(c [78) & x[28)) I (-e [78) & x[29)); 
( - c[78) & x[28]) I (c [78) & x[2!l ) ); 
(c[79) & x[30)) I ( - c[79) & x[31)); 
( - c[79] & x[30]) I (c[79] & x[3 1 ]); 
I I Assign back to x fJ 
for ( int i = 0; i < 32; i + +) 
x [ i ] = temp [ i ] ; 
246 s tat i e in I in e void DDP32_48 ( unsigne d long* x, uns ig n e d lo ng* c, uns ig n e d long* o u t) 
247 
248 
249 uns ig n e d long temp [ 3 2]; 
250 
251 
252 
253 
254 
255 
256 
257 
258 
259 
260 
261 
262 
263 
264 
265 
266 
267 
268 
269 
I I L ayer· 0 
temp [OJ 
temp [ 1 J 
temp[2] 
temp [ 3] 
temp [ 4] 
temp [ 5] 
temp [ 6] 
temp[7] 
t em p] 8] 
temp [9] 
temp [1 OJ 
temp [ 11] 
temp[ l 2] 
temp [ 13] 
temp [ 14 ] 
temp[l5] 
temp [16] 
temp[ 17] 
(c[ O] & x[O]) I (-c[O] & x[ l ]); 
( - c [O] & x[O]) I (c[O] & x[l]) ; 
(c[l] & x[2]) I (-c[l] & x[3]); 
( - c [l ] & x[2]) I (c[1] & x[3]); 
(c[4] & x[4]) I (-c[4] & x[5]) ; 
( - c[4] & x[4]) I (c[4] & x[5]); 
(c[5] & x[6]) I ( - c[5] & x[7]); 
("c [5] & x[6]) I (c[5] & x[7]); 
(c[ l 2] & x[8]) I (-c [1 2] & x[9]); 
( - c[ 1 2] & x[8]) I (c [12] & x[9]); 
(c[ l 3] & x[lO]) I (-c[13] & x[ll]) 
( - c[l3] & x[ l O]) I (c[l3] & x[ll]) 
(c[ l 6] & x[ l 2]) I ( - c[l6] & x[l3]) 
( - c [ l6 ) & x[l2 ] ) I (c[l6] & x[l3 ] ) ; 
(c[l7] & x[l4]) I ( - c[l7) & x[l5]); 
( - c[17) & x( 14]) I (c[l7] & x[l5]) ; 
(c[24) & x(16]) I ( - c[24) & x[17]); 
( -c [24] & x[ l 6]) I (c[24] & x[l7]) ; 
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270 
271 
272 
273 
274 
275 
276 
277 
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279 
280 
281 
282 
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284 
285 
286 
287 
288 
289 
290 
291 
292 
293 
294 
295 
296 
297 
298 
299 
300 
301 
302 
303 
304 
305 
306 
307 
308 
309 
310 
311 
312 
313 
314 
315 
3 16 
3 17 
318 
319 
320 
321 
322 
323 
324 
325 
326 
327 
328 
329 
330 
331 
332 
333 
334 
335 
336 
337 
temp I 1 8) 
temp 119] 
temp 120] 
temp I 2 1] 
templ22] 
temp 123] 
tcmpl24] 
templ25 ] 
temp 126 ] 
tcmpl 27 ] 
temp 128 ] 
temp 129] 
temp[30] 
temp I 3 1 ] 
(cl25] & x[l8]) I (-cl25 ] & xll9]); 
(-c [25] & x l 18]) I (c[25) & x[ l 9]); 
(cl28] & xl20]) I (-c[28 ) & xl21]); 
(-cl28] & xl20]) I (cl28] & xl2 1 ]); 
(cl29] & xl22]) I Ccl29] & x[23]); 
(-cl29] & xl22]) I (cl29] & xl23]); 
(c l36] & xl24]) I (-c[36] & xl25]) ; 
(-c[36] & x[24]) I (c[36] & x[25]); 
(cl37] & xl26]) I (-c[37] & xl27]); 
(-cl37] & x[26]) I (cl3 7] & x [27]); 
(c l40] & xl28]) I (-cl40] & xl29)); 
(-cl40] & xl28]) I (cl4 0] & xl29]); 
(cl4 1] & xl30]) I ( - c l41] & x[31]); 
Ccl41] & xl30]) I (c l 41] & xl31]); 
II Layer 1 (?4-4 butterfli es) 
for ( int i = 0; i < 32 ; i = i + 4) 
{ 
out I i ] = temp I i]; 
o ut [ i + 1] = templi + 2]; 
o u t I i + 2] = temp [ i + 1 ] ; 
outl i + 3) = tcmp[i + 3]; 
II Layer 2 
tempiOJ (cl2] & out iO]) I (-cl2] & out[1]); 
tcmp[1] (-c[2 ] & out[O]) I (cl2] & out[1]); 
tcmp[2] (c[3] & o ut[ 2]) I (-c[3] & out[3]); 
tcmp[3] ( -c[3] & out[2]) I (c[3] & out[3 ] ); 
tcrnp[4] (c[6] & o ut[4]) I Cc [6 ] & out[5]); 
tcmp[5] (-c i 6 J & o ut [4]) I (c[6] & out[5 ]) ; 
tcmp[6] (c[7] & o ut [6]) I (-c [7 ] & out[7]); 
temp[7] ( -c[ 7] & out[6]) I (c[7] & out[7 ] ); 
tcmp[8] (cll4 ] & outl8]) I (-c l14] & out [ 9]); 
tcmpl9] (-cl14] & out[8]) / (c[14] & out [9 ]); 
tcrnp[10] (c[l5] & out[10]) I Cc[ 1 5] & o ut [11]); 
tcmp[ll] Ccl15] & outl10 ] ) I (cl15] & o ut l1 1] ); 
tcmp[12] (cl18] & out l1 2]) I ( - cl18] & o ut l13 ] ); 
tcmp[13] Cc/18 ] & outl12]) I (cl18] & o ut [ l3]) ; 
tcmp [l4] (cl 1 9] & out[ 1 4]) I Cc[19] & o ut l 15] ); 
temp[15] (-cl19] & o utl1 4]) I (c[19] & o ut l 15]) ; 
tcmp[16] (cl26] & outl16]) I (-c[26] & o ut l 17] ); 
tcmp[17] Ccl26] & out l1 6]) I (cl26] & o ut ll7 ]) ; 
tcmp[18] (cl27 ] & out[18 ] ) I (-cl27] & outl19]); 
tcmpll9] (-cl27] & o utl1 8]) I (cl27] & o ut [ 19]) ; 
tcmp[20] (c[30 ] & out[20 ] ) I Ccl30] & o ut [2 1] ); 
templ21] Cc[30] & outl20]) I (cl30] & o ut l21]); 
tcmpl22] (c [31] & outl22 ] ) I ( - cl3 1 ] & o ut [23 ] ); 
tcmp[23] Ccl31] & out l 22]) I (c[31] & o ut l23]); 
tcmpl24) (c [38] & out[24 ] ) I (-cl38] & o ut [25 ] ); 
tcmpl25] (-cl38] & o utl 24]) I (cl38] & o ut [25 ]); 
tcmpl26] (c [39 ] & o ut[2 6]) I (-c i39J & o ut[27] ); 
tcmpl27) Cc [39] & out l26]) I (c[39] & o ut [2 7]); 
tcmp[28] (c l4 2 ] & outl28]) I (-c/42] & outl29]); 
temp 12 9 J C c 14 2 J & out 12 8 J) 1 ( c [4 2] & o ut 12 9 J ); 
tcmp[30] (c [43] & out[30)) I (-c [43) & o ut [31]) ; 
tcmp[31] (-c[43] & o ut[ 30]) I (c[43] & o ut [31]) ; 
II Lay er 3 (?8_12 butterfli es) 
for ( int i = 0; i < 32; i = i + 8) 
{ 
o ut [ i J = temp [ i]; 
o ut[i + 1] = temp[i + 4]; 
out[i + 2] = temp[i + 1] ; 
o ut(i + 3] = tcmp(i + 5]; 
out(i + 4] = temp(i + 2]; 
out(i + 5] = temp[i + 6]; 
o ut [i + 6] = t cmp[i + 3]; 
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356 
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359 
360 
361 
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375 
376 
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381 
ou t [ i ~ 7) lC II lp[i + 7); 
I I Layer 4 
tem p[OJ ( c[8) & out[O)) I c-c[8 ) & o ut[ 1 )); 
temp[ ! ) c- c[8) & o u t[O)) I (c[8) & out[l)); 
temp [2J (c[9J & out[2J) 1 c- c[9J & out[3J); 
temp[3J c-c [9] & o u t[2 J) 1 (c[9J & out [3J); 
tem p[4) (c[ l O] & o ut [4)) I c-c [lOj & out[ 5)); 
temp[5) c-c [ l O] & o ut[4)) I (c[ l O) & o u t[5)); 
temp[6J (c[ l 1) & out[6J) 1 c-c[ ll J & out [ 7J); 
tcmp[7J c- c[l l ] & o u t[6J) 1 (c[ ll ] & o u t [ 7J); 
tcm p[8) (c[20) & out[8)) I c- c[20) & out [ 9]); 
tem p[9) c-c[20] & o u t [8)) I (c[20] & ou t [9)); 
tem p [ l O) (c[2 1] & o u tllO)) I c-c[21) & out[1 l )); 
temp [ l l) Cc[2l) & o u t [ lO)) I (c[21] & out[ ll )); 
tern p [ 1 2 ) ( c [ 2 2 ) & o u t [l 2 J ) I ( - c [ 2 2) & out [ l 3 ) ) ; 
temp[ l 3) c- c[22J & o u t [l 2)) 1 (c[22J & out[13J); 
tcmp[ t 4J (c[23J & out[t4 J) 1 c-c[23J & out[ 1 5)); 
temp[ l 5) Cc[23) & out[ 14]) I (c[23J & out[ l 5)); 
tem p[ l 6] (c[32) & o ut[l6)) I ('c[32) & o u t[ l 7 ) ); 
t crnp[ l 7] ( 'c [32) & out[ l 6]) I (c[32) & out[ l 7 ] ) ; 
temp[ l 8) (c[33) & o u t[l8]) I c-c [33) & o u t[ l 9 ) ) ; 
temp[l9J c-c[33J & out[ l 8]) 1 (c[33J & out[ l 9J); 
temp[20J (c[34) & out[2o]) 1 c- c[34J & o u t[21J) ; 
temp [ 2 1 ) C c [ 3 4) & out [ 2 0]) I ( c [ 3 4) & out [ 2 1)); 
tem p[22J (c[35J & o u t[22]) 1 c- c [35J & o u t [23 J ); 
temp [ 2 3) ( - c [ 3 5) & out [ 2 2]) I ( c [ 3 5] & out [ 2 3]); 
temp[24J (c[44] & out[24]) 1 c-c [44J & o u t[25J); 
tem p [ 2 5) ( - c [ 4 4 J & o u t [ 2 4]) I ( c [ 4 4) & o u t [ 2 5)); 
tcmp[26 J (c[45] & out[26]) 1 c-c [45] & o u t [27]); 
tem p[27 J c-c [45J & o u t [26]) 1 (c [45 ) & o ut[ 2 7 J); 
temp [28J (c[46J & out[28]) 1 c- c [46J & o u t[29J); 
temp[29J c-c[46J & o u t [28J) 1 (c[46J & o ut[29J); 
tem p[3o) (c[47 J & o u t[30 J ) 1 c-c [47J & out [3 t ]); 
tem p [ 3 l) ( - c [ 4 7) & out [ 3 0]) I ( c [ 4 7 J & o ut [ 3 1 ) ) ; 
I I Assign back to out r J 
fo r ( int i = 0; i < 32; i++) 
o u t [ i ) = tem p [ i ) ; 
382 s t a ti c inlin e v o id add_key( uns ig n e d lo n g* x, uns ig n e d long* k) 
383 { 
384 fo r ( int i = 0; i < 32; i++) 
385 
386 x[i) = x[i) • k[i); 
387 
388 
389 
390 II 16 para ll el mod 4 additions wh e1·e x = x + y 
391 s t a ti c in l i n e void paral l e l _additio n ( uns ig n e d long* x, uns i g n e d lo n g* y ) 
392 { 
393 u n s ig n e d lo n g c; 
394 
395 
396 
397 
398 
399 
400 
401 
402 
fo r ( int i = 0 ; i < 32; i = + 2) 
c = x [ i) & y [ i) ; 
x[ i ) = x[i) · y[i]; 
x [ i + 1) = x[i + 1] • y[i + l ) · c; 
403 s t a ti c i n l i ne void rotate _r ig h t_7_32bits ( uns ig n e d lo n g* x) 
404 
405 uns ig n e d long t [ 3 2) ; 
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406 
407 
408 
409 
4 10 
411 
4 12 
4 13 
414 
415 
416 
417 
4 18 
fo r ( int i = 0 ; i < :l2 ; i 1 1) 
tliJ = xl( i -1 25) % ~l2J ; 
II Asstgn bac k to xfj 
fo r ( int i = 0; i < 32; 
{ 
xl i ) = t I i] ; 
} 
i+l) 
4 19 s t at i c i n linc v o id rotat c _rig h t_7_48bits( uns ig n c d long* x) 
420 
421 
422 
423 
424 
425 
426 
427 
428 
429 
430 
431 
432 
433 
434 
435 
u ns ig n e d lon g tl48]; 
fo r ( int i = 0; i < 48; i H -) 
{ 
} 
tli J = xl(i + 41) % 48] ; 
I I A sstgn back to x IJ 
fo r ( int i = 0 ; i < 48; i H) 
X I i l = t I i l; 
436 void c ik sLr o u nd ( uns ig n e d lo n g* L , uns ig ne d long* R, uns ig n d lo n g* K ) 
437 
438 
439 I I PO'I-rn con t 1' o l v e c tor v 
440 { 
441 
442 
443 
444 
445 
446 
447 
448 
449 
450 
451 
452 
453 
454 
455 
456 
457 
458 
459 
460 
461 
462 
463 
464 
465 
466 
467 
468 
469 
470 
471 
472 
473 
uns ig n e d lo n g vI 4 8] ; 
fo r ( int i = 0; i < 32 ; i 1 1-) 
vii] = Rl(i + 25) % 32]; 
} 
fo r ( int i = 0; i < 16; it-+ ) 
{ 
v 1 i + 32] 
II Apply P_J(32I 48) 
DDP::J2A8( L , v, L ); 
II Form control vector v_k 
uns ig n e d lo n g v _k 14 8 1; 
fo r ( int i = 0; i < 48; i++ ) 
v _k I i 1 = I<] i % 3 2]; 
Rli 1; 
II Form control vector v _p (fixed permutation bui l t in) 
uns ig n e d lo ng s _p 13 21; 
DDP32A8(L , v_k, s _p); 
uns ig n e d long v - P 18 01 ; 
fo r ( int i = 0 ; i < 24; i++ ) 
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514 
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518 
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526 
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529 
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531 
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534 
535 
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537 
538 
539 
540 
541 
v_p l iJ == L l i I 8]; 
} 
for ( in t i = 0 ; i < 8 ; i I 1-) 
{ 
v_p I i 1- 24 ] = s _p I i ]; 
for ( int i = 16 ; i < 3 2 ; i ++) 
v -P I i + 16] 
} 
for ( in t i = 0 · i < 
{ 
v -PI i 1 4 8] 
} 
for ( in t i = 8 ; i < 
{ 
v -PI i + 48 ] 
} 
II Apply P_2 (32IBO} 
DDP32_80(R., ·v_p); 
== L l i ] ; 
8 i I + ) 
== Ll i ]; 
32 ; i ++) 
== s _p I i ] ; 
II Form C on tr ol v ec tor v_l 
uns igne d long v_ l l80]; 
for ( in t i = 0 ; i < 1 6 ; i ++) 
v_lli J == Ll i + 16 ] ; 
for ( int i = 0; i < 32; i -1--1-) 
v _l l i + 16 ] == L[i ] ; 
for ( int i = 0; i < 32 ; i ++) 
v_ l li -!- 4 8] Ll i ]; 
II Apply P-4{32180} to key 
DDP32_80(1<, v _l); 
I I XOR round k e y w i th Right. S i d e 
add_kcy ( R., I< ) ; 
II Rotate L e ft sid e 
r otatc_r i g h t_7_32bits(L); 
/ I Form v_pp (fixed p ermuta t i on built in } 
r otatc_right_ 7 _4 8bi ts ( v_k) ; 
uns ig n e d long s_pp 13 2]; 
DDP32A8( L , v_k, s_pp) ; 
uns igne d long v -PP 18 0 ] ; 
for ( int i = 0; i < 8 ; i++) 
v_ppliJ = s _pp [ i + 1 6 ] ; 
for ( int i = 0; i < 4; i++ ) 
{ 
v_pp[i + 8 ] = Ll i J ; 
} 
for ( int i = 1 2; i < 20; i + +) 
{ 
106 
542 
543 
544 
545 
546 
547 
548 
549 
550 
551 
552 
553 
554 
555 
556 
557 
558 
559 
560 
561 
562 
563 
564 
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v_ppli J = S-PP i i 1 12 ] ; 
for ( int i = 4 ; i < 1 5 ; i + +) 
v_ppli + 1 6] = LiiJ; 
} 
for (int i = 0 ; i < 8 ; i ++) 
{ 
v_ppli I 32] s_ppli J ; 
for ( in t i = l 6; i < 2 0; i + +) 
{ 
v_ppli + 24] = L l i ]; 
} 
for ( int i = 8 ; i < 16 ; i + +) 
v_pp I i + 36] = s_pp I i ]; 
for ( int i = 20; i < 32; i++) 
v_ppli -1 32 ] = Lli ]; 
for ( int i = 0 ; i < 1 6 ; i + + ) 
{ 
v -PP I i + 64] = L I i I ; 
II Apply P_6(32l 80) 
DDP32_80(R, v_pp); 
II Add two sides with parallel additions 
pa r a ll eLadditi o n( L , R ); 
II Swap side 
uns igned long* temp 
R = L; 
L = temp; 
R ; 
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Appendix B 
Weight Based Attack Implementation 
Code 
1 /• ***** *** ********** *** ****************** ***** * ** ******** ***~*~************ 
2 
3 Fil ename: ci k s_a tta ck. cpp 
4 Author: Brian J<idney , P. Eng 
5 
6 D escri ptton: 
7 W eight based attack on CJKS- 1 c ip h er. 
8 
9 ***** * *** * ** ************* ********~ ******* * ********* * **********************! 
1.0 
Ll #i nc l ude " i ks_attack. h" 
12 
13 vo id top _down_low _w ig ht_crack () 
14 
15 I I Guess a s ub k e y 
16 II 
17 II For· each of a mill io n vectors 
18 II Run s ubk e y th roug h P4 , call result PSK 
19 I I Run PSI( back through p · (- 1)2 to get rhs 
20 I I Run vec tor back through p · { - 1} 1 to get lh s 
21 I I En cryp t r hs and lhs , recoTd Tesu lt 
22 I I Run s t a tt s tt c a l te s t on se t o f r· e s u l t s 
23 
24 1/----------------------
25 II Exp ec t e d distr·ibition f or th e r es ult s 
26 long double expect d [65) = { 
27 0.0000000000000542101,0.00000000000346945 ,0.000000000 109288, 
28 0 .00000000225 86 1 ,0.0000000344438, 0 .000000413326 ,0 .00000406437 , 
29 0 .000036762 , 0.000239943 ,0.00149297 8 ' 0 .008211379 ,0 .04031040 ' 
30 0 . 178037636 , 0 . 712 150543 ,2.594262693 ,8.64754231,26.48309832, 
3 L 74 .77580704,195 .2479406 ,472 . 7055404 , 1063 . 587466 ,22 28 .46897 6 , 
32 4355.643908 ' 7953. 784527 ' 13587 . 71523,21740 .34437 ,32610 .5 1656' 
33 45896.282 57 ,60648.65911,75287 . 99062,87835.98905,96336.24606, 
34 99346.75375,96336.24606,87 35.98905 ' 75287.99062 ,6064 8 .65911 ' 
35 4 58 9 6 . 2 2 57 ' 3 2 6 1 0 . 5 1 6 56 '2 1 7 4 0 . 3 4 4 3 7 ' 1 3 58 7 . 71 52 3 ' 7 9 53. 7 4 52 7 ' 
36 4355.643908,2228.468976,1063.587466,472.7055404, 195.2479406 , 
37 74 . 77580704 ,2 6 .48309832 ,8. 64754231,2 .5 94262693 ,0.712150543 , 
38 0.178 037636 , 0 .040310408,0.0082 11379,0.001492978,0.000239943, 
39 0 .000036762 ,0 .00000406437,0.000000413326,0.0000000344438, 
40 0 .00000000225861 ,0.000000000109288,0 .0000000000034694 5, 
41 0 .0000000000000542101} ; 
42 1/------------
43 
44 II Se t up f or random number g enerator 
45 long* seed = new long ; 
46 * seed = - 1 * time( NULL ) ; 
47 
108 
48 II Creat e subkeys for s·ix ro tLnds of th e c~p h er 
49 bit sc t < 32> k ey 16]; 
50 kcyiOJ = OxOOOOOOOO ; 
51 fo r ( in t i 1 ; i < 6 ; i ++) 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
key f i ] OxOOOOOOOO ; 
in tk = l ; 
whil e (k <= 6) 
{ 
int bit= (( int )((rand1(sccd) * ( fl oat)(32 . 0)) )) 
if (!kcyliJibit]) 
kcyli ].sc t(bit , true); 
} 
k++; 
66 I I Array to hold c urr ent round data. 
67 int data i 6 J [65] ; 
68 fo r (i nt r = 0 ; r < 6 ; r++) 
69 fo r ( in ti = 0 ; i < 64 ; i++ ) 
70 data I r] I i ] = 0 ; 
71 
72 I I Get s tat is t ics on guesStng th e k ey exac tly 
73 bit sc t < 32> g_s u bkcy = OxOOOOOOOO ; 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
92 
93 
94 
95 
96 
97 
98 
99 
100 
101 
102 
103 
104 
105 
106 
107 
108 
109 
110 
111 
112 
113 
114 
115 
II For eac h of a million v e c t ors {wt <= 6) 
fo r ( int i = 0; i < 1000000 ; i -t--t-) 
II Make r-andom v ec t or 
b i tsct < 32> lh s = OxOOO OOOOO ; 
int k = 0 ; 
whil e (k < 6) 
{ 
int bit = (( int )((randl( sccd) * ( fl oat)(32 .0)))) 
if (!l h s lbit]) 
{ 
lh s . sc t(bit, t r u c ) ; 
} 
k++; 
II Run s ubk e y through ?4, ca ll res ult PSJ< 
bit sc t < 32> psk = g_s u bkcy ; 
II Form Control vec t o r v _l 
b i t s e t < 80> v _I ; 
fo r ( in t c 0 ; c < 16 ; c 1-+ ) 
v_l[ c] l h slc-t-16]; 
fo r ( in t c 16 ; c < 48; c++ ) 
v_l [ c] l h s l c 16J; 
fo r ( int c 4 8; c < 80; c+!-) 
v_l[c] lh s l c 48]; 
DDP32_8Q(ps k , v_ l ) ; 
II Run PSJ< bac k through p -{- 1}2 to get r h s 
II Fm"m con trol vector v_k 
bit sc t < 48> v_k; 
fo r ( int c 0 ; c < 32; c-t-+) 
v _kl c J = g _s u bkcy l cJ; 
fo r ( int c = 32; c < 48 ; c++) 
v_klc] = g_s u bkeyl c - 32]; 
I I Form con tro l v e c tor v_p 
bitsc t < 80> v _p ; 
fo r ( int c 0 ; c < 32 ; c-t-+) 
v _p( c ] = l h slc ] ; 
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117 
118 
119 
120 
121 
122 
123 
124 
125 
126 
127 
128 
129 
130 
131 
132 
133 
134 
135 
136 
137 
138 
139 
14 0 
141 
142 
143 
144 
145 
146 
147 
148 
149 
150 
for ( int c = 32; c < 48; c -j 1-) 
v_p[ c ] = lh s [c - 1 6]; 
b i tset < 32> s _p ; 
s_p = lh s; 
DDP32A8 ( s_p , v _k); 
fo r ( int c 48; c < 8 0 ; c ++) 
v_p[c] = s _p[ c - 48] ; 
I I Permute v _p 
PLl(v_p); 
DDP32_80_1NV ( psk , v -P); 
bitset < 32> rh s = psk ; 
I I Run ve c tor back through p - ( - 1}1 to get l hs 
I I Form control v e ctor v 
bitsct < 48> v; 
for ( int c = 0 ; c < 7; c++ ) 
v[c] = r h s [25 + c] ; 
for ( int c = 7; c < 32; c+ +) 
v[c ] = rh s [ c - 7]; 
for ( int c = 32 ; c < 48; c++) 
v[ c ] = rh s[c - 32 ] ; 
DDP32A8_! NV( lhs, v); 
I I Encrypt rhs and lhs , record resu lt 
for ( int r = 0; r < 6; r + +) 
llciksLround( lh s , rhs , k e yfrj) ; 
I I Count weigh t of outpu t t e xt and s t ore in array 
data[r][lhs.cou n t() + rh s . cou nt()] ++; 
151 I I RUN CHI-SQUARED TEST HERE 
152 in t t em p [ 6 5]; 
153 for ( in t idx = 0; id x < 65; idx + +) 
154 temp[ idx] = d ata [ 5][ idx]; 
155 
156 long double c h iRes ul t = c h iSquaredTest(temp, expected); 
157 
158 cou t << g_s u bkey << end ! ; 
159 for ( int r nd = 0; rnd < 6; rnd++) 
160 
161 co u t << " Rou nd_" << r nd + 1 ; 
162 for ( int wt = 0; wt < 65; wt++) 
163 cout << " ," << d ata[ rnd ][wt] ; 
164 cout << e nd! ; 
165 
166 cout << "Chi- Squa r ed -Result , " << c hi Res ul t << e n d ! ; 
167 
168 I I C lear th e data array 
169 for ( in t r = 0 ; r < 6; r + +) 
170 for ( int i = 0; i < 65; i++) 
171 d a t a[ r ][ i] = 0; 
172 
173 II Get sta t is t s fo r 100 keys off by 1 ,2, ... , 5 bits 
174 for ( int i = 0 ; i < 5; i ++) 
175 
176 for ( in t j = 1 ; j <= 100; j + +) 
177 
178 int bit s_se t = 0 ; 
179 g_s ubkey = OxOOOOOOOO; 
180 while ( bit s_set < i + 1) 
181 { 
182 int bit = (( int )((rand1(seed) * ( flo a t )(32. 0 )))) 
183 if (!g_subkey[bit ] ) 
llO 
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--------------------------------------------
g_s ubkey. set( bit, tru e); 
bi t s_se t f ""; 
II FoT each of a m illion vectoTs {wt <= 6) 
for ( int vee 0 ; vee < 1 000000 ; ve e++) 
{ 
II Make random vec f.OT 
bit se t < 32> lh s = OxOOOOOOOO; 
int k = 0 ; 
while ( k < 6) 
{ 
int bit = (( int )((rand l (seed) 
* ( float )(32 .0 ) ) )) , 
if (! lh sl bit]) 
{ 
lh s.set( bit, true); 
} 
k++; 
II Run subkey through P4, ca ll resul t PSK 
bitset < 32> p s k = g_s ubk ey; 
II Form Co ntTo l vec t or· v_ l 
bitset <80> v_ l ; 
for ( int e 0; e < 16; e++) 
v_ll e ] lh sle + 1 6]; 
for ( int c 16; e < 48; c++) 
v_ll e ] lh slc 1 6]; 
for ( int e 48; e < 8 0 ; c++) 
v_ll e] lh sle 4 8]; 
DDP32_80(ps k, v_l); 
II Run PSK ba c k thToug h p -(- 1)2 t o get Th s 
II Form con tro l vectoT v_k 
bits e t < 48> v _k ; 
for ( int e 0 ; c < 32; e++) 
v_kl e ] g _s ubkeyle J ; 
for ( int e 32; c < 48; e++) 
v_kl eJ g _s ubkeylc - 32 ] ; 
II Form co ntTol vector v_p 
b itse t <80> v_p; 
for ( int e 0 ; c < 32; e++) 
v _pl cJ lh sle]; 
for ( int c 32; c < 48; e++) 
v_pleJ lh s lc- 1 6]; 
bitset <32> s_ p ; 
S-P = lh s; 
DDP32A8(s_p, v_k); 
for ( int c = 48; e < 8 0; e++) 
v -P Ie J = s -P I e - 4 8 J ; 
I I P ermute v_p 
PL1 ( v_p ); 
DDP32_80_INV ( ps k , v -P); 
bitset <32> rh s = p 8k; 
II Run vector back through p -{- 1)1 to get lh s 
II Fonn contro l vector v 
bitset < 48> v; 
for ( int c = 0; c < 7 ; e++) 
v ic ] = rh s l25 + e]; 
111 
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} 
} 
for ( inl e = 7 ; c < :i2; ell) 
v[ c ] = rh s [ c - 7]; 
for ( int c = 32; c < 4 8; ell) 
v[ e ] = r h s[e - 32]; 
DD I 32A8JNV(lh s , v); 
II Encrypt rhs and lh s , rf•co1·d 1·esult 
for ( in t r = 0; r < 6; r I I ) 
llctks Lround{lhs, rhs, keyfr/); 
I I Count wetght of ou t put I ext 
II and store tn an·ay 
data [ r ][ lh s.count () I rh s.count ()]-11; 
I I RUN CHI-SQUARED TEST IIERE 
int t e m p [65]; 
for ( int idx = 0 ; idx < 65; id xil) 
t e mp[ idx ] = d a t a [ 5] [ idx]; 
lon g double e hiRcsult = c hi Sq uar cdTcst(tcmp , expcc l. c d ); 
cout << g_subk cy << c ud! ; 
for ( i nt rnd = 0 ; rnd < 6; rnd I I ) 
eout << " Round_" << rnd I I ; 
fo r ( in t wt = 0 ; wt < 65 ; wtll) 
cout < < "," << data [ rnd] [ wt] ; 
eout << e nd!; 
cout << " hi - Squared-Res u lt, " << ehiResu lt < < e nd! ; 
I I C lear the data arr ay 
for ( in t r = 0 ; r < 6 ; r ++) 
for ( i nt i = 0 ; i < 65; i + l) 
clata[r] [i] = 0 ; 
292 long double c h iSq u arcdTcst ( in t dat a [] , long double ex p ee t e d [ ] ) 
293 { 
294 lon g double c hi Sqr = 0 ; 
295 
296 II for e a ch in th e 65 possibl e vnlue8 
297 for ( int i = 0 ; i < 65; i ++) 
298 
299 lon g do ubi t emp ; 
300 I I 0 - E x pec t ed 
301 t e mp = ( long d o uble)data[ i] - (cxpected[ i ]• lOOOOOO ); 
302 I I (0-E) ·2 
303 t emp = t emp * temp; 
304 II (O-E) .2IE 
305 t emp = t c onp / (expected[i]*lOOOOOO) ; 
306 I I Sum 
307 chiSq r = e hiSqr + t emp ; 
308 } 
309 I I R eturn l.o be summed 
310 r e turn ch iSq r ; 
311 
112 
r------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Appendix C 
Differential Attack Implementation Code 
1 /•************ ************************************ ************** *********** 
2 
3 Fil ename: diff e r en tial_ 3_round_version. cpp 
4 Author: Brian Kidney, P. Eng 
5 
6 D esc r i ption: 
7 T est t o d e t ermi n e if th e correc t k ey can be obtain us ·ing a th ree round 
8 version of CJKS- 1 and th e 10 -> OJ -> 11 differential. 
9 
10 *** *********** ********** **** **********************************************! 
11 #include " diff_3_round _ve r s ion .h" 
12 #include " util.h" 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
struct State 
c h ar L [32) ; 
c h ar R[3 2); 
c h a r 1<[32) ; 
} ; 
void thr ee _round_difL c r eate_ciphertext () 
{ 
const int rounds = 3; 
c h ar keys[ 32)[rounds) ; 
c h ar difLk eys [32 ) [rounds ); 
long* see d = new long ; 
*seed - 1 * time ( NULL ) ; 
int totaLte s t_ s iz e 100000; 
II In itia l ize k e y s to 4 r andom values to be use fo r th e en t ire t est 
for ( int p = 0 ; p < ro unds; p++) 
{ 
long key= ( ((int)((randl(seed) * ( fl oat)(OxFFFF)) ) << 16) 
+ ( int )((rand1( seed) * ( fl oat)(OxFFFF))) ); 
in t mask = Ox OOOOOOO 1 ; 
for ( int i = 0; i < 32; i + + ) 
k eys[i)[p) = (char) ((boo l ) (mask & key)); 
diff_key s [i)[p) = (char)(( boo l )(mask & key)); 
45 mask <<= 1 ; 
46 
47 } 
48 c h a r actua1Key [32); 
49 memcpy(actualKey , &keys[O)[rounds-1), 32); 
113 
50 cout << "Act u a l-key:_"<< c r ca t e_ nl o n g(act n alKey) << e n dl; 
5 1 
52 for ( int i = 0 ; i < t o tal_t es L size; i -1 +) 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
II Set random v alu es f or the left and right plainl e 3:l, 
long left = ( (( long) (( randl (seed ) * ( float )( OxFF'FF') )) << 16) 
( long )((randl (seed) * ( float )(OxF'F'F'F')) ) ); 
long ri g ht = ( (( long )(( rand l (seed) * ( float )(OxF'F'F'F })) << 16} 
1 ( long )(( r a nd1 (seed} * ( float )(OxFFFF ))) } ; 
II l nitta l ize state variables 
State state; 
State d if L state; 
II The l e ft and rig ht va lues to be unaltered. 
c r eate_a rray( s t ate. L , l e ft ); 
c r ea t e_a rray ( state .R , right); 
II The l e ft and rig ht va lues t o be alter·e d by 1 b i t 
c r eate_a rray(d iff_sta t e .L, l e ft }; 
c r eate_a rr ay ( difLstate . R, ri ght}; 
II l ntrod1tce the diffe r·e nc e into any of the 32 bits 
int difference_hit = ( int )(rand1(seed} * 32 . 0) ; 
if (dif f_ s tate.L(difference_bit] = 0) 
diff_ s tate . L [ difference_bit J I ; 
e l se 
diff_sta te . L[ difference_bit] O· 
' 
for ( int j = 0 ; j < r o und s; j + ) 
I I E ncrypt 1 round 
memcpy( s tate.K, &k eys [O)(j] , 32); 
memcpy( difLst a tc . l<, & kcys[O)[j], 32); 
ci k s l_round (state); 
c i ks 1_ro u n d ( d iff _state ) ; 
89 II R ecord th e result 
90 cout << crea t e_ ul o n g (state. L } << "_, 
9 1 << c r ca t e_ ul ong (s t ate .R) << " _, 
92 << e r ea t e_ ulon g( diff_sta t e. L) <<"" 
93 << crea t e_ ul o n g( diff _s t a tc . R} << e ncll ; 
94 
95 de l e t e seed ; 
96 
97 
98 void t hr ee_ro und _d ifLk ey_sco r e () 
99 
int good_diffe r e nti a l_cou n t 
I I Load the ftl e 
fstream file; 
fi I e. o p e n (" c iph ertext. txt "); 
i f ( I f i I ) 
{ 
O· 
' 
100 
101 
102 
103 
104 
105 
106 
107 
108 
109 
110 
111 
112 
113 
11 4 
115 
116 
117 
cout << "Canno t-ope n _f il e . " << cndl 
} 
e l se 
s trin g templ, tcmp2; 
uns ig n e d long key; 
uns ig n e d long I ; 
uns igne d long r; 
uns ig ned long d I ; 
uns igne d long dr; 
114 
11 8 
119 
120 
121 
122 
123 
124 
125 
126 
127 
128 
129 
130 
131 
132 
133 
134 
135 
136 
137 
138 
139 
140 
141 
142 
143 
144 
145 
146 
147 
148 
149 
150 
151 
152 
153 
154 
155 
156 
157 
158 
159 
160 
161 
162 
163 
164 
165 
166 
167 
168 
169 
170 
171 
172 
173 
174 
175 
176 
177 
178 
179 
180 
181 
182 
183 
184 
185 
fi lc >>temp1 >>t e mp2>> key; 
I I F or eac h data e t 
while ( fil e >> l >>r >>cll >>clr) 
{ 
} 
II S e t up data varia bl es 
char bL[3 2J; 
c r ea te_array (bL, I); 
char bR[3 2]; 
c re a t e_array(bR , r) ; 
char bDL[3 2 ] ; 
c r ea t e_a rray (bDL, cll); 
c har bDR [32 ] ; 
creatc_array ( bDR, dr); 
char bK [32 ]; 
c r ca t e_a rr ay ( bi<, key); 
char bDK[32]; 
c r ea te_ a rray (bDI< , key); 
int total_diff_left = 0; 
int total_difLright = 0 ; 
Stat e norm ; 
Stat e cliff ; 
memcpy ( norm . L , 
memcpy (norm .R, 
memcpy (norm .I< , 
memcpy ( cl i ff . L, 
memcpy( cliff .R, 
memcpy ( d i ff . I< , 
bL, 32); 
bR , 32 ); 
bi< , 32); 
bDL, 32); 
bDR, 32) ; 
bDK , 32) ; 
II decript with key. 
c i k s Lr o u nd _i nv (norm); 
c iksLro und_inv ( cliff); 
for ( int k = 0; k < 32; k++) 
if (norm.L[k] != cliff . L[k ] ) 
tot a I_ d if L ri g ht ++; 
if (norm.R[k ] != cliff . R[k ] ) 
total _d iff _left ++; 
II see if th ere is a 1 - 1 difference. 
II if so add 1 to count 
if ( totaLdiff_right = 1 && total_diff _l ef t 1 ) 
goo d _d i ff c r e n tial _co unt ++; 
I I Output count. 
cout << " Actual_Count-"<< g ood_diffc r c ntiaLco unt << end!; 
for (int j = 0 ; j < 32; j ++) 
good _d i ffercn t i aLcou n t O· , 
fi lc . c lose(); 
file .opc n(" c iph c rt cx t. txt"); 
s tring tcmpl, temp2; 
unsigned long key ; 
unsigned long I ; 
unsigned long r ; 
unsigned long d I ; 
unsigned long dr; 
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211 
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213 
214 
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217 
218 
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220 
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222 
223 
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226 
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228 
229 
230 
231 
232 
233 
234 
235 
236 
237 
238 
239 
240 
241 
242 
243 
244 
245 
246 
247 
248 
249 
250 
251 
252 
fi I c >>tempi >>t e mp2>>key ; 
II Fo1' e a c h rlatn, set 
while (file >> l >>r >>dl >>dr) 
} 
/1 Set up data vari abl es 
c h a r bLI32]; 
c rcate_array (bL, I ); 
c h a r bR I32]; 
create_ar r ay (bR, r ) ; 
c h a r bDL I 3 2]; 
creatc_ar r ay (bDL, d I) ; 
c har bDRI32]; 
c re a tc_array (bDR, dr) ; 
c h a r bf<l32 ]; 
c r catc_arr ay (bK, key); 
char bDKI32 ]; 
c r ca t e_ a rr ay (bDK , key) ; 
if (bK I j l = 0) 
bl< 1 i J 1 ; 
e l se 
bl< I i J o; 
if (bDKi j J = 0) 
bDK I j l 1 ; 
e l se 
bDKij ] 0; 
int total_diff_left = 0; 
in t total_diff_right = 0 ; 
State norm ; 
Stat e diff; 
memcpy ( norm 
mcmcpy ( norm 
mcmcpy ( norm 
memcpy( d i ff 
memcpy ( d i ff 
memcpy( d if f 
II d ec T'i p t 
.L , 
.R, 
.K, 
-L , 
.R, 
.K , 
with 
bL, 32); 
bR, 32 ); 
bK , 32) ; 
bDL, 32); 
bDR, 32); 
bDK , 32); 
k ey , 
ciksLround _in v ( norm); 
ciksLround_in v (cliff); 
for ( int k = 0; k < 32 ; k++) 
if (norm , L I k] != d iff , L I k]) 
totaLdiff_ r ight++ ; 
if (norm.R i kJ != cliff . R i k]) 
tot a I_ d iff _I cf t ++; 
II see if there is a 1 - 1 d iffer e nce-
I I if so add 1 to c ount 
if (totaLdifLr i g h t = 1 && totaLdi ff _le f t 
good _d i ffcren ti aLco u n t ++; 
I I Output count_ 
co u t << good _differcntiaLco u nt << end l ; 
116 
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